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PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF 
"UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES 
William Michael Treanor* 
and Gene B. Sperling** 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 1 re-
shaped the law of abortion in this country. The Court overturned two 
of its previous decisions invalidating state restrictions on abortions, 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 2 and Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 3 and it abandoned the trimester 
analytic framework established in Roe v. Wade. 4 At the time Casey was 
handed down, twenty states had restrictive abortion statutes on the 
books that were in conflict with Akron or Thornburgh and which were 
unenforced. 5 In six of these states, courts had held the statutes uncon-
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1. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
2. 4 76 U.S. 74 7 (1986). For that part of Casey overturning Thornburgh's finding of a 
constitutional violation when a government regulation requires the provision of 
information that is truthful but aimed at convincing women not to have abortions, see 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (plurality opinion). 
3. 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Akron 1). The Supreme Court in Akron I held 
unconstitutional a mandatory 24-hour waiting period and a requirement that women 
considering abortion be provided with information that, while truthful, was designed to 
dissuade them from having an abortion. Casey overturned these holdings. See Cast')', 
112 S. Ct. at 2822-26 (plurality opinion). 
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For the relevant part of Casey, see 112 S. Ct. at 2818 
(plurality opinion) (rejecting Roe's trimester framework). 
5. The following is a list of the relevant statutory or regulatory provisions that 
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stitutional.6 Almost as soon as the Casey ruling was announced, the 
campaign to secure enforcement of these restrictions began. 7 
Are these statutes good law, despite the fact that they were once in 
conflict with governing Supreme Court precedent (and in some cases 
had been judicially determined to violate women's constitutional 
rights)? Alternatively, will they have to be re-enacted by the legislature 
to be enforceable? These questions highlight the revival issue. The 
revival issue arises when a court overrules a prior decision in which it 
had held a statute unconstitutional. (We will throughout this article 
refer to the first decision as the "invalidating decision," and to the sec-
ond decision as the "overruling decision.") Should the enforceability 
of a statute passed prior to the overruling decision be determined by 
reference to the invalidating decision-in which case the statute would 
have to be repassed to be in effect-or by reference to the overruling 
decision-in which case the statute would not have to be repassed? In 
other words, does the overruling decision automatically revive a previ-
ously unenforceable statute? 
established waiting periods and/or counseling requirements that were inconsistent with 
the Court's holding in Akron I and Thornburgh: Ala. Admin. Code r. 420-5-.03 (Supp. 
1990); Del. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 1794 (1987); Idaho Code§ 18-609 (1987); Ind. Admin. 
Code tit. 410, r. 3.5-1 to 3.5-4 (1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 311.726, .729 (Michie/ 
Bobbs-Merrill 1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6 (West 1992); Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 22, § 1599 (West 1992); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1990 & 
Supp. 1992); Miss. Code Ann.§§ 41-41-33,-35 (Supp. 1990); Mo. Ann. Stat.§ 188.039 
(Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1992); Mont. Code Ann.§ 50-20-104(3), -106 (1991); Neb. Rev. 
Stat.§§ 28-326(8), -327 (1989); N.D. Cent. Code§ 14.02.1-03 (1991); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann.§ 2317.56 (Baldwin Supp. 1992); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 3205 (Supp. 1991); 
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 23-4.7-2 to -5 (1989); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 34-23A (Michie 
1987 & Supp. 1993); Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-15-202 (1991 & Supp. 1992); Utah Code 
Ann.§§ 76-7-305, -305.5 (1990 & Supp. 1993); Wis. Stat. Ann.§ 46.245 (West 1987), 
§ 146.78(1), (2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990); Wis. Admin. Code§ [Med] 11.04 (May 
1989). On the absence of enforcement of these statutes, see National Abortion Rights 
Action League, Who Decides? A State-by-State Review of Abortion Rights (4th ed. 
1993) [hereinafter 1993 NARAL] (analyzing status of state abortion regulations). 
6. See Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.O. Ky. 1984) (Kentucky statute); 
Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984) (Louisiana statute), aff'd, 794 
F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986); Women's Community Health Ctr. v. Tierney, Civ. No. 79-162-
p (D. Me. Sept. 9, 1983) (Maine statute); Planned Parenthood v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 
(1st Cir. 1981) (Massachusetts statute); Barnes v. Moore, No. J86-9458(W) (S.D. Miss. 
Aug. 30, 1991) (Mississippi statute), rev'd, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 656 (1992) (reversal based on Casey); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 
92CVH01-528 (Ohio Ct. C. P., Franklin County, May 27, 1992), rev'd, 1993 WL 303631 
(Ohio Ct. App.,July 27, 1993) (Ohio statute) (reversing lower court's grant of injunctive 
relief barring operation of the Ohio statute and holding the statute constitutional in 
light of Casey). 
7. See Letter from Eric I. Miller, Esq., Miller and Waters, Attorneys and Counselors 
at Law, to John C. Bailey, M.D., State Health Commissioner, Indiana State Board of 
Health (June 29, 1992) (seeking enforcement oflndiana informed consent law in light of 
Casey) (on file with authors); see also Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 13-14 (5th Cir. 
1992) (reversing lower court injunction against enforcement of Mississippi statute in 
light of Casey). 
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The way in which the revival issue is resolved will thus determine 
whether, in light of Casey, previously unenforced statutes became en-
forceable without the need for any post-Casey legislative action. In ad-
dition to affecting what kind of abortion regulations are in effect in 
twenty states in the immediate wake of Casey, this determination has 
profound consequences for the kind of abortion regulations that will be 
in effect in these states in the future. Such long-term consequences 
reflect the fact that our governmental system is not one of pure majori-
tarianism and that the burden of inertia in our legislative process is 
heavy: as we will discuss, statutes on the books can stay on the books 
even if a current majority no longer desires them; in contrast, proposed 
statutes need supermajoritarian support to secure passage.8 There-
fore, the starting point for future legislative action-such as whether 
pre-Casey abortion regulations are enforceable-influences the legisla-
tive action that in fact develops. 
The revival issue arose in perhaps its starkest form in the case of 
Weeks v. Connick. 9 In 1989, elected officials in Louisiana responded to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 10 
by claiming that Roe had been effectively overruled and by seeking en-
forcement of a draconian 134-year-old law criminalizing abortion 1 1 
which had previously been found unconstitutional under Roe .12 The 
court in Weeks avoided confronting the revival issue by holding that the 
statute in question had been implicitly repealed. 13 As the Court's deci-
sion in Casey made clear, Webster did not overrule Roe, and the Court is 
unlikely to allow the enforcement of criminal abortion laws in the near 
future. But Louisiana's attempt to enforce its 1855 statute focused sig-
nificant attention for the first time on the future status of the dozens of 
then-unconstitutional state abortion restrictions, as well as on the revi-
val issue more generally. 14 
8. For further discussion, see infra Part III.A. 
9. 733 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990). 
10. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
11. The statute prohibited all abortions and provided that doctors who performed 
abortions would receive a minimum sentence of one year at hard labor and a maximum 
sentence of ten years at hard labor. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:87, :87.4, :88 (West 
1986). 
12. See Weeks, 733 F. Supp. at 1037. 
13. After the criminal abortion statute was enjoined in 1976, the Louisiana 
legislature passed a series of statutes regulating abortion. The court held that, by thus 
opting for the path of regulation rather than criminalization in these statutes, the 
Louisiana legislature implicitly repealed the earlier statute. See id. at 1037-38. After 
Weeks, the state legislature amended and narrowed this criminal abortion statute. See 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 14:87 (West 1993). See also Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 
930 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding statute unconstitutional and granting injunction against 
enforcement), aff'd, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1414 (1993). 
The amended statute is discussed at note 113, infra. 
14. For examples of press coverage of this story, see Louisiana: Back to the "Dark 
Ages"?, Newsweek, Oct. 9, 1989, at 34; Frances Marcus, Louisiana Lawyers Move to 
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While the Court's recent abortion decisions dramatically illustrate 
the consequences that may follow when a court, after having held a 
statute unconstitutional, overrules that decision, the revival issue is cer-
tainly not limited to the abortion context. Indeed, it is one that will 
likely arise with growing frequency in the coming years, for the 
Supreme Court has been closely divided recently on a wide range of 
constitutional matters. In his 1991 dissent in Payne v. Tennessee, 15 Jus-
tice Marshall listed seventeen important constitutional cases decided 
since 1985 by a vote of five to four. 16 Given the Supreme Court's cur-
rent state of ideological flux, Justice Ginsburg's recent appointment, 
and the likelihood of additional Supreme Court vacancies in the next 
few years, there may well be reversals of determinations of unconstitu-
tionality involving affirmative action, 17 the Establishment Clause, 18 free 
speech, 19 and governmental takings of private property.2° Increasing 
the likelihood of such reversals is the overall tendency by the Court in 
recent years to accord diminished weight to the principle of stare 
decisis. 21 
In this Article, we argue that in some-but notall-circumstances, 
Revive Invalidated Laws Banning Abortions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1989, at A9; Ruth 
Marcus, State Pleads to Reimpose Criminal Abortion Law, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1989, at 
A7. 
15. IllS. Ct. 2597,2619-25 (1991) (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
16. See id. at 2623 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
17. See Wygandt v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-84 (1986) (layoff 
provision that favored minority teachers found to violate Equal Protection Clause) (five 
vote majority opinion). 
18. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408-14 (1985) (Establishment Clause 
found to bar governmental financial assistance to parochial schools) (five vote majority). 
19. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74-76 (1990) (First Amendment 
right not to be denied public employment or pay increase within public employment 
because of party affiliation) (five vote majority); Peel v. Attorney Registration and 
Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1990) (attorney found to have First 
Amendment right to advertise legal specialization) (five vote majority); Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-92 (1987) (First Amendment right of public employee to 
express views on matters of public importance) (five vote majority). 
20. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2888 (1992) 
(governmental regulation that deprives property of all value is a taking unless regulation 
reflects restrictions present in the background principles of the state's law of property 
and nuisance) (five vote majority). 
21. See generally Michael Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68 (1991). For example, according 
to Professor Gerhardt's study, of the 105 cases in which the Court has overturned prior 
decisions, 64 were handed down from 1960 to the present. See id. at 147-59 (listing 
cases). There are, of course, exceptions to this general trend, and Casey reflects a 
greater respect for precedent than had been commonly anticipated. See generally 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 27-40 (1992) (discussing Casey and Lee v. 
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), as instances of "surprising moderation" which 
reflected presumption that precedent should be followed in the absence of compelling 
reasons to the contrary). 
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statutes that were unconstitutional under the rule enunciated in the in-
validating decision should not be revived when the invalidating deci-
sion is overturned. We base this conclusion upon two separate and 
independent theoretical bases. 
First, full examination of the revival issue demonstrates the inter-
active nature of the relationship between judicial invalidation of stat-
utes and majoritarian decision-making. Judicial review is not purely 
external to the legislative process: the very act of judicial invalidation 
powerfully shapes subsequent legislative deliberations. Belief in the final-
ity of judicial judgments is so pervasive that, when a statute is struck 
down or when a judicial decision establishes a rule oflaw under which a 
statute is unconstitutional, its opponents frequently act as if the statute 
were gone for all time. At the very least, even if political actors realize 
the potential for reversal, the finding of unconstitutionality alters the 
way in which they spend their political capital. As a result, rather than 
seek to repeal a statute that appears to be, for all practical purposes, a 
nullity, they devote their political resources to other-more clearly con-
sequential-matters. Revival in such circumstances can produce are-
sult contrary to what the political process would have produced in the 
absence of the initial judicial decision. 
We will call the response of political actors to judicial decisions 
political reliance. Proper concern for the majoritarian process leads to 
the conclusion that in some situations political reliance merits protec-
tion through nonrevival. 
Second, the revival issue dramatically raises the question: when 
should statutes adopted by past majorities establish the starting point 
for current majoritarian lawmaking? The revival issue thus forces re-
consideration of a question that has troubled Americans since the times 
of the debates over the ratification of the Constitution: why should we 
defer to what past majorities decided rather than consider issues anew? 
In this Article, we argue that, given the essentially libertarian bias of 
our constitutional system of governance, a statute that has once been 
unconstitutional under governing case law should not be revived if it 
constrains individual liberty (as do, for example, the abortion regula-
tions sanctioned by Casey). 
The way to protect political reliance and to force legislative recon-
sideration of constitutionally problematic statutes is through an exten-
sion of the doctrine of prospective overruling. When a court 
prospectively overrules an earlier decision, it decides that the new rule 
of law-the law announced in the overruling decision-will be applied 
only in cases that arise in the future; other cases will continue to be 
decided under the rule of law enunciated in the decision that is being 
overruled. The doctrine of prospective overruling currently applies 
only to conduct engaged in prior to the overruling decision. Recogni-
tion of the existence and the importance of political reliance and of the 
importance of legislative reconsideration of constitutionally problem-
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a tic statutes warrants an expansion of this technique. In this Article, we 
will argue that in a limited class of cases the doctrine of prospective 
overruling should be available to courts as they consider the enforce-
ability of statutes enacted prior to the overruling decision. Thus, in cer-
tain instances, the overruling decision would not lead to revival; rather, 
a court would apply the rule of law of the initial decision to statutes 
passed prior to the overruling decision and therefore bar enforcement 
of the statutes (unless they were repassed after the overruling decision). 
This argument for the extension of prospective overruling is novel, 
and the argument that the overruling decision need not always mean 
automatic revival runs counter to the weight of judicial and scholarly 
opinion on point. The Supreme Court has-without analysis of the is-
sue-revived previously unenforceable statutes. A limited number of 
state courts and commentators have explicitly addressed the issue and 
have concluded almost uniformly that a statute barred under the invali-
dating decision becomes enforceable when that decision is overturned. 
There is, however, no controlling federal case law in which the revival 
issue is addressed, and so, with respect to federal law and the law of 
most states, the revival issue remains open. In Part I, as a prelude to 
our argument, we set out this relevant case law and scholarly work. 
Part II elaborates on the first of the two previously discussed theo-
retical bases for the argument against revival. Here, we develop the 
political reliance argument for prospective overruling in the statutory 
context and outline when political reliance makes prospective overrul-
ing appropriate. This part discusses what political reliance is and offers 
specific historical examples in which political actors have shaped their 
decisions in reliance on judicial decisions. It then compares political 
reliance to other types of reliance interests that the law safeguards 
through the use of stare decisis, qualified immunity for government of-
ficials in tort suits, and prospective overruling. 
We argue that, just as Benjamin Cardozo created the doctrine of 
prospective overruling to protect individuals who structured transac-
tions in reliance on judicial decisions, so it is now appropriate to extend 
the doctrine of prospective overruling to the statutory context to pro-
tect political decision-making. We see prospective overruling in the 
statutory context as an exercise of the judicial power to construct a 
remedy to protect those who have relied on earlier judicial pronounce-
ments. Use of this technique would be discretionary and situation-
specific, and we discuss in what types of cases it would be appropriate 
to use prospective overruling to protect political reliance. Specifically, 
we contend that in determining whether there has been political reli-
ance and whether such reliance merits protection, courts should con-
sider the amount of time that elapsed between the invalidating decision 
and the overruling decision, whether the statute at issue was clearly un-
constitutional under the invalidating decision, and whether the statute 
was passed before or after the invalidating decision. 
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Part III develops the second of our two arguments against revival, 
focusing on the question of when current majorities should be forced 
to revisit previously passed statutes. In addition to advancing a theo-
retical basis for prospective overruling of statutes separate from that 
developed in Part II, this part defines a separate category of cases in 
which use of the technique is appropriate. We draw here on Alexander 
Bickel's argument in his essay "The Passive Virtues"22 that courts 
should use a variety of technical devices to force current legislative re-
consideration of constitutionally troublesome statutes. Consideration 
of Bickel's essay and its implications suggests that use of the doctrine of 
prospective overruling is particularly appropriate when the statute in 
question implicates individual liberty interests. The technique of pro-
spective overruling should be used to ensure that, when an invalidating 
decision is concerned with the protection of individual liberty, a statute 
that was unconstitutional under the rule oflaw set forth in that decision 
is not revived by the overruling decision. Such a statute should be en-
forceable only if it is desired by a current majority, and the measure of 
whether it is desired by a current majority is whether it is repassed fol-
lowing the overruling decision. 
I. CASES AND WRITINGS ON REVIVAL 
While the great majority of relevant judicial opinions and scholarly 
writings favors revival, it is striking how little consideration the issue 
has received and how little case law has explicitly addressed the topic. 
Typically, it has simply been assumed, without recognition of the at-
tendant problems, that if a statute is constitutional under the rule es-
tablished in the overruling decision it should be enforceable without 
the need for repassage. When the revival issue has been analyzed, the 
analysis has generally been both cursory and highly formalistic. This 
part surveys the case law and previous writings bearing on revival, be-
ginning with Supreme Court decisions and then turning to state court 
opinions and the scholarly literature. 
A. Supreme Court Case Law 
The Supreme Court has not authoritatively addressed the issue of 
whether the enforceability of a statute passed prior to the announce-
ment of the overruling decision should be judged by the rule of law 
enunciated in the invalidating decision or by the rule of law enunciated 
in the overruling decision. Nonetheless, in several cases it has simply 
applied the rule of law of the overruling decision to such statutes, 
adopting an approach in accordance with the general principle that a 
new rule of constitutional law applies retroactively.23 Thus, it is true 
22. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive 
Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961). 
23. It should be added at the outset that there are exceptions to this general 
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both that revival has been the Supreme Court's practice and that the 
Court has not resolved the revival issue. 
The principle that new rules oflaw normally apply retroactively has 
considerable antiquity. The relevant Supreme Court precedent can be 
traced back to the 1801 decision in United States v. Schooner Peggy. 24 
Schooner Peggy involved a condemnation proceeding for a French ship 
seized pursuant to presidential authorization. While the case was 
before the Court, a treaty with France was ratified which provided that 
property that had been seized but not definitively condemned had to be 
returned to its owners. The Court therefore faced the question 
whether the treaty governed the case, even though ratification followed 
issuance of decisions by the district court and circuit court. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall held the treaty applicable, stating if "a law ... positively 
changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed."25 While 
Schooner Peggy concerned the retroactive effect of a treaty, the doctrine 
that a change in law applies retroactively was later extended beyond 
this context. Thus, the Supreme Court in 1969 observed that a new 
rule of law applies retroactively, regardless of whether the basis of the 
change in law is "constitutional, statutory,judicial [,or even] where the 
change is made by an administrative agency acting pursuant to legisla-
tive authorization. "26 
This principle of retroactive application of new law has been ap-
plied by the Court when it evaluates the constitutionality and enforce-
ability of statutes passed prior to the announcement of a new rule of 
constitutional law. Indeed, the Court seems not to have even consid-
ered that in this context special circumstances might warrant the pro-
spective application of a new rule of law. Casey illustrates this point. At 
the time of its passage, the Pennsylvania statute at issue in the case was, 
according to the holdings in Akron and Thornburgh, unconstitutional. 27 
Yet, having decided to overrule these precedents, the Court simply ap-
principle. In particular, as will be discussed in Part II, infra, prospective overruling is an 
exception to that principle. 
24. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103 (1801). 
25. Id. at 110. 
26. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 282 (1969). In Thorpe, the Court ruled 
that the Schooner Pegg;· doctrine applied to intervening agency decisions. Five years later, 
however, the Court retreated from applying the Schooner Pegg;· doctrine in this context. 
See NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347,417 U.S. I, 10 & n.lO (1974) 
(remanding for agency determination the decision as to whether a new policy should 
apply retroactively). On the ambit of the Schooner Pegg;· doctrine, see John B. Corr, 
Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "as Applied," 61 N.C. L. Rev. 745, 
756-57 ( 1983) (discussing the Schooner Pegg;· doctrine and its relationship to conflicting 
criminal law doctrines); Walter V. Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 
1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. I, 19-21. 
27. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2822-26 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (overruling the decisions in Akron I and Thornburgh that found informed 
consent requirements to be unconstitutional and also overruling .~kron f's ban on 
waiting periods). 
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plied its new rule of law to the challenged statute. The Court did not 
consider whether it would have been more appropriate to judge the 
statute's constitutionality or its enforceability under the case law that 
governed at the time of its passage or that had governed during its 
existence prior to the Court's decision in Casey. 28 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 29 also illustrates the point. In Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital 30-the decision overturned in West Coast Hotel-
the Court had found that the District of Columbia statute establishing a 
minimum wage for children and women violated liberty of contract. In 
West Coast Hotel, the Court considered a substantially similar 
Washington State statute establishing a minimum wage for women. 
The Court overruled Adkins and, without analysis, simply applied its 
new rule of law to uphold the Washington State statute.31 
Neither Casey nor West Coast Hotel concerned the same statute that 
had been the subject of the invalidating decision. The Legal Tender 
Cases, 32 however, represent the application of a statute in a context in 
which the Court had previously held that the statute could not constitu-
tionally be applied. In Hepburn v. Griswold,33 the Supreme Court in 
1870 held that the Legal Tender Act of 186234-which provided that 
federally issued notes could be used to pay off any debt-could not 
constitutionally be applied to obligations entered into before its pas-
sage.35 Less than two years later, with the appointment of two new 
28. See id. It should be added that, on remand, the district court has ruled that the 
Supreme Court's decision in Casey did not ultimately resolve the question of the 
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute. According to the district court, the 
Supreme Court found only that certain portions of the statute were constitutional on the 
record before it, and the district court directed that the record be supplemented in 
order to determine whether, on a fuller record, the statute would still satisfy the undue 
burden test of the Casey plurality. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 822 F. Supp. 227, 
233 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
29. 300 u.s. 379 (1937). 
30. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379. 
31. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400. It should be added that the Washington 
State statute, originally passed in 1913, had been continuously enforced since its 
enactment, despite the Court's ruling in 1923 in Adkins and despite the fact that there 
was no material difference between the District of Columbia statute overturned in Adkins 
and the Washington state statute. See id. at 388-91. Thus, lrest Coast Hotel is not a case 
in which the Court permitted enforcement of an unenforced statute. It is, however, a 
case in which a statute's constitutionality was determined by the rule of law enunciated 
in the overturning case, rather than the rule of law in the overturned case. 
32. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). 
33. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1868). 
34. 12 Stat. 345, 532. 
35. The case was decided by a vote of five to three, and the five vote majority was 
split as to its rationale. Four Justices held that the statute covered preexisting 
obligations and that in so doing it violated the Legal Tender Clause. Justice Grier, the 
fifth vote for the majority, took the position that the statute did not cover preexisting 
debts, but that if it did, it was unconstitutional. See Hepbum, 75 U.S. at 626. (Justice 
Grier did not file a separate opinion. He voted on the case in conference, but resigned 
from the Court between the time when the decision was scheduled to be read and when 
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Justices to the Court, the Court reversed itself, specifically overruled 
Hepburn, and found the Act constitutional as to both preexisting and 
subsequent obligations.36 Injustifying the reversal, the majority in the 
Legal Tender Cases noted that there was a vacancy on the Court at the 
time that Hepburn was decided and that constitutional issues should not 
be resolved "in the absence of a full Court, if it can be avoided. " 37 The 
Court also stated that, while overruling "should not be done inconsid-
erately, ... in a case of such far-reaching consequences as the present, 
thoroughly convinced as we are that Congress has not transgressed its 
powers, we regard [overruling] as our duty."38 In contrast to this con-
cern with overruling precedent, there was no analysis at all of whether 
the statute should have to be repassed by Congress in order to be en-
forceable. The Court treated it as clear that repassage was not 
necessary. 39 
Supreme Court case law thus weighs in favor of revival; in a variety 
of circumstances, the Court has found that statutes that were inconsis-
tent with a previous decision automatically became enforceable when 
that decision was reversed. This does not, however, imply active con-
sideration of the revival issue. Indeed, in In re Rahrer,40 when one of 
the parties advanced the claim that a statute functionally identical to 
one held unconstitutional by the Court could be enforceable only if it 
were repassed after the Court had reversed its initial determination of 
unconstitutionality, the Court made clear that it was not resolving that 
it was ultimately read. His position was summarized in the opinion of the Court. See 
id.) The three dissenters look the position that the statute applied to preexisting debts, 
and that it could constitutionally do so. See id. al 637-38 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
36. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 553. 
37. Id. at 554. 
38. Id. 
39. With respect lo the Legal Tender Cases, we are nol arguing that, under our 
approach, Congress would have had lo re-enact the Legal Tender Act after the over-
ruling decision in order for it lo apply lo preexisting debts. In Part II we contend that 
there are a variety of factors that courts should employ in deciding whether there has 
been political reliance and hence whether requiring re-enactment would be appropriate. 
One factor is the extent to which it was clear that the invalidating decision applied to the 
statute al issue in the subsequent case. See infra Part II.D. Thus, when the invalidating 
decision actually concerned the statute lateral issue, as in Hepburn, political reliance is to 
be expected in the ordinary course of events. However, since the Hepburn decision 
provoked immediate controversy and was judicially reconsidered and rejected within a 
brief period of time, the argument that the Legal Tender Act was nol repealed because 
of political reliance is weak. See discussion infra notes 143-145 and accompanying lexl. 
For further discussion of the history of the Legal Tender Cases, see 6 Charles Fairman, 
History of the Supreme Court of the United Stales, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-
88, Part I, at677-775 (1971); Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 367; Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court 
and the Legal Tender Cases (installment 1), 54 Harv. L. Rev. 977 (1941) [hereinafter 
Fairman, Legal Tender Cases]. 
40. 140 u.s. 545 (1891). 
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issue.41 In those cases in which an unenforceable statute became en-
forceable, revival seems to have occurred because the Court assumed 
that it was a logical consequence of reversal, rather than because the 
Court considered the arguments against revival and rejected them. 
B. State Courts 
Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly ad-
dressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have con-
cerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held 
unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is over-
turned.42 With one exception, they have concluded that such statutes 
are immediately enforceable. 
The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by 
a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pro-
nounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in 
West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer 
41. See id. at550-52 (argument of appellee); id. at 559-65 (opinion of the Court). 
Rahrer was prosecuted under a Kansas statute that barred selling any liquor in the state. 
In Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), the Court had held that a similar Iowa statute 
violated the Commerce Clause because it extended to liquor in interstate commerce. 
The rationale in Leisy was that states could regulate the sale of liquor in interstate 
commerce only with congressional approval, and that Congress had not approved such 
regulation. See Leisy, 135 U.S. at 119-25. After Leisy, Congress passed the Wilson Act, 
ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1988)), which permiued states 
to ban the sale of all liquor. Rahrer's auorneys argued that the decision in Leisy had 
rendered the Kansas Act a nullity, and that it would have been enforceable only if the 
state had repassed it after Congress had enacted the Wilson Act. See Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 
550-52. The Court, however, found this argument inaccurately described Leisy. It stated 
that the Kansas law and similar statutes were never "absolutely void, in whole or in part 
... as if they had never been enacted. On the contrary, [Leisy] did not annul the law, but 
limited its operation to property strictly within the jurisdiction of the State." I d. at 563. 
In support of his argument that precedent supported revival, Professor Nimmer invoked 
the result in Rahrer. He minimized the significance and logical force of the language just 
quoted, writing, "Notwithstanding this disclaimer, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that under Leisy, prior to the Wilson Act the Kansas statute was regarded as void 'in 
part,' i.e., in its application to interstate commerce in liquor." Melville B. Nimmer, A 
Proposal for Judicial Validation of a Previously Unconstitutional Law: The Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1394, 1418 n.l02 (1965). Nimmer's auack on the 
coherency of the Court's reasoning in Rahrer is telling. But the more important point 
for our argument is that the Court avoided confronting the revival issue directly. The 
result in Rahrer was that a statute that was once judicially barred from enforcement 
became enforceable. Nonetheless, the "disclaimer" had the effect of allowing the Court 
to avoid explicitly adopting the revival principle. 
42. This issue is a subset of the revival issue. The revival issue is concerned, not 
simply with statutes that have been held to be unconstitutional, but with statutes that 
were never actually declared unconstitutional but that were at odds with the rule of law 
in the invalidating decision. As Casey and Jl'est Coast Hotel suggest, revival in the latter 
category of cases has been automatic. It is only with statutes specifically invalidated that 
revival has been seen as at all problematic and, as this part of the text indicates, even in 
this context courts have almost uniformly found that revival occurs. 
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Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's 
statute. The Attorney General responded, 
The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the 
courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that 
notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a stat-
ute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a stat-
ute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring 
it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid 
from the date it became effective.43 
Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action.44 
When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia injawish v. Morlet 45 held that the 
decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute 
enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the 
revival issue 
proceed on the principle that a statute declared unconstitu-
tional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforce-
able, but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished; 
that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead; 
and that if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its 
first effective date.46 
The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in ac-
cord with the principle 'that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdic-
tion overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and 
the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was 
the law.' "47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court 
acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of 
Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court 
put it, " '[J]ust about everybody was fooled.' "48 Nonetheless, the 
court's view was that since the minimum wage law had always been 
valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need 
to reenact it.49 
Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a 
statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have 
reached the same result as the jawish court, using a similar formalistic 
43. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 22, 22-23 (1937). 
44. Seejawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96,97 (D.C. 1952) (effect of overruling a case is 
that the former decision was never valid). Congress did amend the minimum wage act 
prior to Jawish. See id. An argument could be made that in amending the statute after 
West Coast Hotel Congress was in effect repassing the statute, thus rendering the revival 
issue moot. The Municipal Court of Appeals did not, however, consider such an 
argument. 
45. 86 A.2d 96, 97 (D.C. 1952). 
46. Id. (emphasis added). 
47. Id. (quoting Ruppert v. Ruppert, 134 F.2d 497, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1942)). 
48. Id. (quoting Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
314 u.s. 678 (1941)). 
49. See id. 
1914 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1902 
analysis.50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival 
position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, 51 a poorly reasoned decision of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child sup-
port and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial 
level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing 
period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even 
though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the ap-
plicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. 
One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was 
that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules 
should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for 
the husband, the Court stated: 
Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially 
unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we 
have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as 
counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule 
of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, 
when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as 
law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial de-
cree changing the finaljudgment of unconstitutionality to con-
stitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law 
by the Court-an assumption of legislative power not dele-
gated to it by the Constitution.52 
The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival 
question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconsti-
tutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival there-
fore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally 
mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage 
50. As the Indiana Supreme Court stated in Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86, 95 (1874): 
"ll was not the overruling of those cases which gave validity to the statutes; but the cases 
having been overruled, the statutes must be regarded as having been all the time the law 
of the State." Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court, in deciding that the overruling 
decision revived the unconstitutional statute, used the same metaphor as the jawish 
Court: "[T]hough a statute declared unconstitutional becomes inoperative, it is not 
dead, only dormant." State ex rei. Badgett v. Lee, 22 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1945). For 
other state court decisions embracing the revival principle, see Christopher v. Mungen, 
55 So. 273, 280 (Fla. 1911) (statute inoperative while invalidating decision stands but 
enforceable upon reversal of that decision); State v. O'Neil, 126 N.W. 454, 454 (Iowa 
1910) (dicta stating that a statute previously held unconstitutional is valid and 
enforceable without reenactment when the supposed constitutional amendment has 
been removed); McCollum v. McConaughy, 119 N.W. 539, 541 (Iowa 1909); State v. 
Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485, 491 & n.6 (La. 1973) (dicta overruling an invalidating decision 
and applying challenged statute); State ex. rei. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 638 
(Miss. 1991) (dicta refusing to overrule an invalidating decision in part out of concern 
for the effects of the statute if revived). 
51. 153 So. 2d 368 (La. 1963), aff'd, 163 So. 2d 74 (La. 1964). 
52. ld. at 370 (citations omitted). 
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of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a 
creature of judicial decision-making. 
jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of pow-
ers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the jefferson rationale, a "re-
vived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, 
instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has 
never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legis-
lative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been 
found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have 
had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected 
by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found 
unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized 
a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned 
decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of 
prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied 
on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. 53 In short, the one case 
in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer 
a convincing rationale for nonrevival. 
C. Commentators 
Commentators have generally agreed with the overwhelming ma-
jority of courts that an overruling decision has the effect of automati-
cally reviving statutes. For example, Erica Frohman Plave observed 
that revival was a necessary function of the limited scope of a judicial 
determination of unconstitutionality: "Such laws [laws found unconsti-
tutional] are merely unenforceable until such time as they are found 
valid."54 Professor Gerald Gunther has pronounced Attorney General 
Cummings's conclusion that Adkins "simply 'suspend[ed]' enforce-
ment"55 of the District of Columbia minimum wage statute "persua-
sive[],"56 and Professor Melville Nimmer similarly declared that "[i]t 
seems clear that Attorney General Homer Cummings' opinion was cor-
rect."57 Finally, Professor Oliver Field noted that a statute that has 
been found unconstitutional becomes enforceable when the case in 
which it was held unconstitutional is reversed because "[a] declaration 
of unconstitutionality does not operate as a repeal of a statute."58 
53. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying 
notes 87-89 (discussing qualified immunity for government officials who rely on existing 
law). One final point aboutjefferson merits mention: The Louisiana Supreme Court has 
subsequently embraced the revival position, though it did so without overruling (or even 
acknowledging) jefferson. See State v. Douglas, 278 So. 2d 485, 491 & n.6 (1973). 
54. Erica Frohman Plave, Note, The Phenomenon of Antique Laws: Can a State 
Revive Old Abortion Laws in a New Era?, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 111, 124 (1989). 
55. Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 28 (12th ed. 1991) (quoting 39 Op. Att'y 
Gen. 22, 22 (1937)). 
56. See id. 
57. Nimmer, supra note 41, at 1412. 
58. Oliver P. Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute 10 (Di Capo Press 
1916 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1902 
All of these analyses rest on a problematic premise. Implicit in the 
scholarly articles-and in the state judicial decisions and in the 
Supreme Court case law previously discussed-is the idea that revival 
1971) (1935). For other conclusions similar to those mentioned in the text, see Earl T. 
Crawford, The Legislative Status of an Unconstitutional Statute, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 645, 
651 ( 1951) ("The overruling decision removes the bar and the statute becomes 
promptly effective without legislative re-enactment .... "); Paul B. Linton, Enforcement 
of State Abortion Statutes after Roe: A State-by-State Analysis, 67 U. Det. L. Rev. 157, 
237 (1990) (following Professor Field); Mark Graham, Note, State v. Douglas: Judicial 
'Revival' of an Unconstitutional Statute, 34 La. L. Rev. 851 ( 1974) (arguing that statute 
is revived when holding of unconstitutionality is reversed because initial holding merely 
prevented enforcement of statute). 
This Article focuses on the general question of whether a statute that is inconsistent 
with a governing judicial decision becomes enforceable when that decision is reversed. 
The issue of the potential revival of abortion statutes is used in this Article primarily to 
illustrate the larger theoretical issues raised by this question. It should be added, 
however, that there are other particularly strong arguments against revival of abortion 
statutes. Indeed, the anti-revival position would be compelling if Roe were to be 
overturned and an attempt were then made to enforce the pre-Roe criminal abortion 
statutes remaining on the books. With respect to older abortion statutes (such as the 
1855 criminal abortion statute at issue in Weeks), there is a strong argument that the 
statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause because the "statutory objective ... reflects 
archaic and stereotypic notions." Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 
725 ( 1982). In addition, there is Supreme Court precedent indicating that, when 
legislation is of marginal constitutionality, the statute will be enforced only if the 
legislature considered the legislation's impact on constitutional interests. See Califano 
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 n.9 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Perhaps an actual, 
considered legislative choice would be sufficient to allow this statute to be upheld, but 
that is a question I would reserve until such a choice has been made."); Greene v. 
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959) (requiring showing that legislative body gave 
"careful and purposeful consideration" to "decisions of great constitutional dimension 
and import"); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) ("[I)f ... 'liberty' is to be 
regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress."). Abortion 
statutes passed by legislatures that had not considered the statutes' impact on women's 
constitutional rights would then be unenforceable; with respect to pre-Roe statutes, it is 
almost definitional that legislatures failed to consider relevant constitutional concerns. 
Finally, there is a separation of powers issue when a long unenforced criminal statute 
becomes enforced through the unilateral actions of executive branch prosecutors, rather 
than because of a considered legislative judgment. For further development of these 
arguments, see Brief of Amici Curiae NARAL at 21-41, Weeks v. Connick, 733 F. Supp. 
1036 (E.D. La. 1990) (No. 73-469) [hereinafter NARAL Brief); Reva B. Siegel, 
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 356-57 & n.386 (1992); Teresa L. 
Scott, Note, Burying the Dead: The Case Against Revival of Pre-Roe and Pre-Casey 
Abortion Statutes in a Post-Casey World, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 355, 370-81 
(1993). It should also be added that, if Roe were to be overturned, the argument that 
due process bars prosecution of those women who had abortions before issuance of the 
overruling decision would be compelling. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 570-71 
( 1965) (holding that due process clause does not permit conviction of individuals who 
demonstrated at site at which officials had told them they could demonstrate); Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1745 n.65 (1991) ("The retroactive application of a 
new decision that effectively criminalized prior conduct that had been previously held 
immune from prosecution would presumably deny due process."). 
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reflects appropriate judicial deference to majoritarian decision-making. 
The majority speaks when it passes the statute. For a time, the courts 
may have blocked the majority's will. But, having determined that the 
majority was in fact empowered to pass the statute originally, the court 
should simply remove the bar on enforcement and, by allowing en-
forcement, permit the majority's will again to govern. 
What this analysis misses is that the initial judicial opinion can have 
a transformative effect on majoritarian decision-making. The fact that 
''just about everybody was fooled" 59 is consequential. People generally 
assume that a judicial decision is final or unlikely to be reversed and act 
accordingly. That a statute remains on the books after it has been 
found unconstitutional may say very little about what the majority of 
the population currently thinks about that statute. Such a statute may 
not be repealed even though it no longer has majoritarian support. 
Part II develops this insight and its significance. 
Moreover, there may be circumstances in which-given a statute 
that is sufficiently constitutionally problematic to have been at one time 
inconsistent with governing judicial interpretations of constitutional 
law-it is appropriate to force the legislature to reconsider its position 
on the statute itself. This is the topic of Part III of this Article. 
II. PoLITICAL RELIANCE 
The law promotes reliance on judicial decisions through various 
doctrines. When courts adopt new rules oflaw, they are able to protect 
those individuals who have acted in reliance on the old rule of law 
through prospective overruling. In tort suits, limited immunity shields 
government officials who relied on an old rule oflaw. A primary end of 
stare decisis is to safeguard those who have relied on judicial decisions. 
An invalidating judicial decision affects the political decisions that 
people make. Opponents of a statute that has been either held to be 
unconstitutional or that is unconstitutional under a rule of law that a 
court has announced in invalidating another statute take the invalidat-
ing decision into account as they decide whether to spend their political 
capital on repeal. Political actors have a finite set of resources that they 
can deploy to influence legislative (and other) processes; the invalidat-
ing decision affects the way those resources-their political capital-are 
spent. In reliance on the invalidating decision, political actors are likely 
not to seek repeal or not to seek it vigorously. Similarly, they are likely 
not to focus their efforts on opposing a proposed new statute that 
would be unenforceable under the invalidating decision. Such political 
reliance on the invalidating decision is at least as deserving of protec-
tion as other reliance interests that are currently protected by the law. 
To protect such political reliance, in certain circumstances courts 
59. Jawish v. Mor1et, 86 A.2d 96,97 (D.C. 1952) (quoting Warring v. Co1poys, 122 
F.2d 642, 646 (D.C.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941)). 
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should be able to use the technique of prospective overruling in evalu-
ating the enforceability of statutes. In other words, when there has 
been political reliance on an invalidating decision that is subsequently 
overturned, a court should have the power to evaluate a statute's en-
forceability using the rule of law enunciated in the invalidating deci-
sion, rather than the rule of law set forth in the overruling decision. 
The overruling decision would then operate only prospectively-per-
mitting enforcement of a statute passed after, but not one passed 
before, its announcement. 
The judicial power to apply the overruling decision only prospec-
tively can be justified on choice of law grounds. The new rule of law is, 
under this approach, almost like a constitutional amendment, and con-
stitutional amendments have been held not to validate statutes passed 
prior to the amendment's ratification (unless they were intended to do 
so). A better approach, however, is to regard prospective overruling as 
an exercise of the judicial power to fashion appropriate constitutional 
remedies. Under this approach, the question of whether to apply the 
technique of prospective overruling will turn on the equities of the situ-
ation. We conclude this part with a discussion of when prospective 
overruling is appropriate. Specifically, we will argue that, with respect 
to potential revival of a particular statute, a court should take account 
of: ( 1) the amount of time between the invalidating decision and the 
overruling decision; (2) how clear it was that the statute at issue was 
unconstitutional under the invalidating decision; (3) the relative timing 
of the statute's passage and the relevant judicial decisions. 
A. The Effect of a Finding of Unconstitutionality on the Political Process 
When a court finds a statute unconstitutional and bars its enforce-
ment, it alters the stakes involved in that statute's repeal. The decision 
also alters the stakes involved in passage of a new statute, if that statute 
is clearly unconstitutional under the rule of law enunciated in the deci-
sion. Because the stakes are altered, the operations of the political 
processes are altered. Political actors know that, at least in the short 
term, a statute that has been found unconstitutional or that is clearly 
unconstitutional under governing case law will not be enforced. Given 
our legal system's respect for precedent, they also know that the statute 
is presumptively unenforceable in the long term. Indeed, political ac-
tors may act as if overruling were not a possibility, as if the statute 
would never be enforceable. 
It is hard to mobilize either the legislative or popular support 
needed to secure the repeal of a statute when it is unenforced and when 
it has been pronounced unconstitutional. If doctors who performed 
abortions were being sentenced to ten years of hard labor, as the 
Louisiana statute at issue in Weeks permitted, there would have been 
ongoing testing as to whether that result was one desired by the people 
of Louisiana. But because of Roe there was no enforcement of the stat-
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ute and hence no rallying point for repeal. As the Maryland Supreme 
Court suggested in johnson v. State,60 inertia can keep statutes pro-
nounced unconstitutional on the books, regardless of whether or not 
they have current majoritarian support: 
[A]n unconstitutional act is not a law for any purpose, cannot 
confer any right, cannot be relied upon as a manifestation of 
legislative intent, and, "is, in legal contemplation, as inopera-
tive as though it had never been passed." Norton v. Shelby 
County, 118 U.S. 425,442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886); 
Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566-67, 
33 S.Ct. 581, 57 L.Ed. 966 (1913). Because of this principle, 
legislative bodies often fail to repeal unconstitutional statutes, 
deeming them obsolete matter which can be later deleted in 
the course of a general revision or recodification of the laws 
on the particular subject.61 
The story of New York Assemblyman George Michaels and his vote 
on the 1970 measure to repeal New York's criminal abortion statute 
illustrates how differently the political process can function when deci-
sions have immediate consequences. Michaels represented a district 
that was sixty-five percent Catholic, and he decided that in order to 
save his seat he had to vote against repeal. Nonetheless, his family had 
urged him to vote to eliminate the existing statute. His son, an intern 
in a Cincinnati ghetto, had told him of the suffering that he had seen 
caused by illegal abortions. When Michaels told his wife that his 
planned vote was inconsequential since repeal would inevitably occur 
in a few years, she replied, "In the meantime, thousands of women will 
be butchered in underworld abortion[s]."62 
Despite these arguments, Michaels initially voted to keep the crimi-
nal abortion statute on the books, and then, as the vote concluded but 
before it was finalized, realized that repeal would lose by one vote. Just 
before the final tally was announced, Michaels took the floor. The New 
York Times reported: 
Assemblyman George M. Michaels of Auburn, his hands trem-
bling and tears welling in his eyes, stopped the roll-call only 
seconds before the clerk was to announce that the reform bill 
had been defeated for lack of a single vote .... "I realize, Mr. 
Speaker," Mr. Michaels said, "that I am terminating my polit-
ical career, but I cannot in good conscience sit here and allow 
my vote to be the one that defeats this bill-I ask that my vote 
be changed from "no" to "yes. " 63 
For Assemblyman Michaels, recognition of the consequential nature of 
60. 315 A.2d 524 (Md. 1974). 
61. Id. at 528. 
62. Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 48 (1990) (quoting from 
Lawrence Lader, Abortion II: Making the Revolution 145 (1973)). 
63. Id. (quoting from Bill Kovach, Abortion Reform Is Voted by the Assembly, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 10, 1970, at I). 
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his vote powerfully influenced what he did. Clearly, if Roe had been the 
law of the land in 1970, Michaels would have voted against repeal. 
A judicial decision invalidating a statute also skews the political dy-
namic because, as a result of that decision, proponents and opponents 
of the statute will attach different levels of symbolic importance to its 
repeal. Similarly, they will attach different levels of symbolic impor-
tance to the passage of new statutes that are also unconstitutional 
under the invalidating decision. Again, the skewing favors the propo-
nents of the invalidated statute. The proponents, having lost in the 
courts, place a premium on legislative endorsement of their position: 
the legislature alone can provide a statement in favor of their views by 
an official governmental actor. Opponents of a statute will attach less 
symbolic value to what the legislature does. For them, the effect of leg-
islative endorsement will only be cumulative, since the courts have al-
ready embraced their position. 
This difference in symbolic importance for the two sides can alter 
the political process so that it produces a result inconsistent with major-
ity wishes. A legislator will incur the enmity of those who support an 
"unconstitutional" bill by working for its repeal or opposing similar 
legislation; she is unlikely to win offsetting support from the bill's op-
ponents. The fate of an Arkansas statute that required public schools 
to allocate as much time to the teaching of creation science as to evolu-
tion illustrates this phenomenon. Although understood to be unconsti-
tutional, the statute was passed by the legislature almost without 
discussion.64 The President Pro Tempore of the Senate explained, 
"[l]t was meaningless, just a piece of junk, so why not vote for it."65 
Had opponents of the bill attached as much importance to blocking it 
as proponents did to ensuring its passage, the Senator would not have 
made that statement. But because the statute's symbolic importance 
was different for the two camps, he voted in favor of the bill. 
Thus far the discussion has concerned the ways in which the invali-
dating decision creates incentives that work both against the repeal of 
existing statutes that are unenforceable under the invalidating decision 
and in favor of the passage of similarly unenforceable statutes. It is also 
important to recognize that there are ways in which the invalidating 
decision simply alters the political calculus in ways that make it impossi-
ble to determine whether a particular statute would be on the books if 
the invalidating decision had never been issued. One can imagine a 
range of responses on both sides to an invalidating decision. Because 
of the decision, opponents of the statute might devote little energy to 
its repeal and focus instead on, say, the repeal of enforceable statutes 
that they oppose. Supporters of the "unconstitutional" statute might 
64. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Ca1abresian Sunset: Statutes in the 
Shade, 82 Co1um. L. Rev. 1752, 1763 n.36 (1982) (reviewing Guido Ca1abresi, A 
Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982)). 
65. Id. at 1764 (quoting President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Ben Allen). 
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focus their energy on passing legislation of marginal constitutionality in 
order to test the exact contours of the invalidating decision. Alter-
nately, opponents of a statute might think reversal of the invalidating 
decision sufficiently likely that they will devote more resources to re-
peal than will proponents of the statute, who may assess the likelihood 
of reversal differently or who may choose to pursue other ends for stra-
tegic reasons. What is clear, however, is that, after the invalidating ju-
dicial decision is issued, political actors take it into account and the 
decision thereby affects the political process. 
Two leading constitutional law cases further illustrate the opera-
tion of political reliance. The Civil Rights Act of 187566 was the last 
triumph of the brief heyday of Radical Reconstruction. Indeed, the 
bill was passed after the electoral tide had shifted: A Republican-
dominated Congress enacted it in March 1875, days before the Demo-
crats who had won control of the House in the 1874 election took their 
seats.67 That statute provides for criminal penalties for racial discrimi-
nation in public accommodations and for civil penalties for such dis-
crimination without the need of securing injunctive relief. The 
Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional in 1883 in the Civil Rights 
Cases ,68 stating that neither the Thirteenth nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provided Congress with the power to enact the legislation.69 
Since that time the statute has been unenforced. 7° Current case law 
makes it clear that Congress has the power to ban such discrimination 
under the Commerce Clause. 71 If a statute that has been found uncon-
66. ActofMarch l, l875,ch.ll4, l8Stat.,335(l875). Sections3and4oftheact 
have been repealed. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862, (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 44-45) (1988). Sections l and 2 of the Act have never been 
repealed, while Section 5 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1984 (1988). See Historical Note to 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1984 (West 1981) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 has been 
codified at this section but is not printed because it is "obsolete," the Supreme Court 
having held it unconstitutional). For a discussion of the Act and its history, see Nimmer, 
supra note 41, at 1394-98. 
67. See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, 
at 553-56 (1988). 
68. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
69. See id. at 25 ("On the whole we are of opinion, that no countenance of 
authority for the passage of the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground of authority for its 
passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared void .... "). 
70. See Historical Note to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1984 (West 1981); Nimmer, supra note 
41, at 1394-98. 
71. The leading case on point is Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241 (1964). Heart of Atlanta did not overrule the Civil Rights Cases. Rather, it 
distinguished them on the grounds that the defenders of the statute in the earlier case 
had not based their claim of federal power on the Commerce Clause, relying instead on 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 252. At the same time, it 
indicated that those providing public accommodations in 1881 might not have been 
engaged in interstate commerce, but that by 1964 (the time of the Heart of .1tlanta 
decision), they were so engaged. See id. at 251. 
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stitutional can be revived by subsequent case law, the statute would 
presumably be enforceable today. But given the enduring powers of 
segregationist forces in national politics in the years after 1883 and 
through much of the twentieth century, it is almost inconceivable that 
the statute would not have been repealed if it had been perceived as a 
possibility that it might become enforceable, and yet it has never been 
repealed. 
More recently, the response to Roe demonstrates the consequences 
of political reliance. In the years from 1967 to 1973, the period imme-
diately before Roe was handed down, nineteen states reformed their 
abortion laws.72 By apparently ending the need for this process, Roe 
also largely ended the process itself, as the seventeen unenforced but 
unrepealed pre-Roe criminal abortion statutes suggest.73 When Roe 
was announced, one Planned Parenthood official recalled a decade 
later, "Most of us really believed that was the end of the controversy. 
The Supreme Court had spoken, and while some disagreement would 
remain, the issue had been tried, tested and laid to rest. " 74 Instead of 
fighting over repeal of unenforceable pre-Roe statutes, pro-choice and 
pro-life forces in the wake of Roe primarily struggled over whether 
there should be a constitutional amendment on abortion and over legal 
issues that Roe had left open; this was particularly true in the years 
before 1980, when President Reagan's election suggested that, through 
new appointments to the Supreme Court, Roe might be overturned. 
Thus, at the federal level, the post-Roe congressional debate in the 
years before 1980 largely focused on federal funding for abortions. At 
the state level, debate centered on whether legislation should be en-
acted that burdened a woman's attempt to exercise the right Roe 
recognized. 75 
Roe skewed the political process in two additional ways. First, as 
Professor Tribe has observed: 
[The pro-life movement] harnessed the power of single-issue 
politics to elect public officials who believed, as they did, that 
abortion was murder and that it should be outlawed. Ironi-
cally, Roe contributed to the success of [the pro-life] move-
ment because it prevented government from legislatively 
restricting access to abortion. Those who did not agree with 
the right-to-life position thus could vote for pro-life candi-
dates with whom they otherwise agreed without concern that 
antiabortion views would actually be enacted into enforceable 
laws.76 
72. See Tribe, supra note 62, at 49 (citing Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and 
Divorce in Western Law (1987)). 
73. See 1993 NARAL, supra note 5, at vi. 
74. See Flora Davis, Moving the Mountain: The Women's Movement in America 
Since 1960, at 181 (1991) (quoting Planned Parenthood executive). 
75. See Tribe, supra note 62, at 139-60. 
76. Id. at 16. Professor Tribe assumes that pro-life and pro-choice voters behave 
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Tribe's point here is bolstered by the fact that Webster produced the 
opposite result. A National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) 
survey conducted in 1989, shortly after the decision in Webster, con-
cluded that only twenty-three of the ninety-nine state legislative bodies 
favored keeping abortion legal. After Webster suggested that Roe was 
imperiled, pro-choice support at the state legislative level grew dramat-
ically. In 1993, NARAL determined that fifty state legislative bodies 
supported legalized abortion. 77 
Second, by making a class of abortion legislation unenforceable, 
Roe ironically made such legislation easier to pass. In his amicus brief 
in Webster, Solicitor General Charles Fried observed about this process: 
[B]ecause legislators know that whatever they enact in this 
area will be subject to de novo review by the courts, they have 
little incentive to try to moderate their positions. The result, 
all too often, has been statutes that are significant primarily 
because of their highly "inflammatory" symbolic content. ... 
This process has undermined the accountability of legislative 
bodies and has disserved the courts and the Constitution. 78 
Like Arkansas's creation science statute, then, these "unconstitutional" 
abortion statutes show that proponents of an unconstitutional statute 
attach greater importance to passing such statutes for symbolic reasons 
than their opponents attach to blocking them. 
Thus, the four cases surveyed-Assemblyman Michaels and New 
York's abortion statute, the Arkansas Senator and creation science, the 
political responses to the Civil Rights Cases and Roe-illustrate the criti-
cal points about political reliance. First, those who oppose the invali-
dated statute-those, in other words, who are sympathetic to the 
invalidating decision-rely on the invalidating decision as they conduct 
their political activities. Second, judicial invalidation of a statute affects 
majoritarian political deliberation in a way that makes it incorrect to 
differently: During a period in which it is clear that a woman's right to an abortion 
receives significant constitutional protection, pro-life voters are more likely to vote on 
the basis of a candidate's stand on abortion than are pro-choice voters. This assumption 
makes sense if pro-life voters are more likely to be one-issue voters than are pro-choice 
voters. We believe this assumption is correct, but Tribe's insight is not necessarily 
generalizable to revival issues outside of the abortion context. In other areas, it may be 
the case that opponents of a statute that has been held unconstitutional are more likely 
to judge a candidate on the basis of her stand on that statute than are proponents of the 
statute. 
77. See 1993 NARAL, supra note 5, at v. 
78. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21 n.l5, Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605); see also NARAL Brief, supra note 58, at 
24 (quoting language in the Solicitor General's brief in ll"ebster as evidence that abortion 
decisions had a "distortive effect" on the political process); Guido Calabresi, The 
Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional 
Accountability (What the Bark-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 147 
n.220 (1991) (skewing effect of Roe and its progeny on political process may make 
revival of abortion statutes counter-majoritarian); Scott, supra note 58, at 368-70 
(discussing quoted language from Solicitor General's brief in Webster). 
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assume that either the failure to repeal an "unconstitutional" statute or 
the passage of an "unconstitutional" statute after a court has estab-
lished a rule under which that statute is unconstitutional accurately re-
flects the will of the current majority. Third, not only does judicial 
invalidation affect the political process, it tends to do so in a particular 
way, tilting the process towards the retention and passage of"unconsti-
tutional" statutes. 
B. Protection of Reliance Interests 
As has been pointed out, courts have not recognized political reli-
ance as an interest that merits protection when they determine to over-
rule a decision. In other areas of constitutional law, however, courts 
recognize that individuals who order their affairs in reliance on judicial 
decisions have a claim to protection, and doctrines have been devel-
oped that protect such reliance. 
Stare decisis is such a doctrine. While the scope and rationale of 
stare decisis are the subject of great debate among commentators and 
in the courts,79 as Professor Earl Maltz has observed, "The most com-
monly heard justification for the doctrine of stare decisis rests on the 
need for certainty in the law. In planning their affairs, it is argued, peo-
ple should be able to predict the legal consequences of their actions."80 
In Justice Harlan's words, stare decisis advances the "predictability re-
quired for the ordering of human affairs over the course of time."81 
Even for Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has a constrained notion of the 
value of stare decisis, 82 reliance on judicial decisions merits protection 
and is a principal ground for the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, in 
Payne v. Tennessee, the Chief Justice observed: 
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the 
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
79. For an analysis of Supreme Court Justices' competing conceptions of stare 
decisis, see Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 114-31. For recent scholarly analyses of the 
doctrine's role, see, e.g., id. at 131-45 (examining the implications of the Justice's 
individual approaches to precedent); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 724 (1988) (concluding that 
"original understanding must give way in the face of transformative or longstanding 
precedent"); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 595 (1987) (examining 
the role of precedent outisde sphere of legal doctrine and within law); Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 
11 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 67, 67 (1988) (discussing the circumstances under which the 
Supreme Court may appropriately overrule a major constitutional decision). 
80. Earl M. Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 367, 368 (1988); see 
also Schauer, supra note 79, at 597 ("The most commonly offered of the substantive 
reasons for choosing strong over weak precedential constraint is the principle of 
predictability"); Stone, supra note 79, at 70 ("doctrine of precedent ... [advances] 
predictability in our affairs"). 
81. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 127 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
82. See Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 128-31 (viewing Rehnquist as maintaining that 
"precedents carry little weight in and of themselves in decision-making"). 
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principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contrib-
utes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process.83 
The Chief Justice thus believes that the presence of reliance makes the 
case for stare decisis most compelling: "Considerations in favor of 
stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract 
rights, where reliance interests are involved; the opposite is true in 
cases ... involving procedural and evidentiary rules."84 In publicly 
explaining his decision in Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist has indicated 
that the basis for this distinction is his belief that "few criminals would 
base their decision to commit a crime" on Supreme Court evidentiary 
precedent, but that people making decisions on property and contracts 
issues do take such precedent into account. 85 
Even assuming that Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct as an empiri-
cal matter about whether criminals rely on precedent, there is no logi-
cal reason why the only reliance worthy of protection should be that 
involving decisions regarding contracts or property. Individuals rely 
on judicial decisions as they make noneconomic decisions, just as they 
do when they make economic decisions, and the former class of choices 
are at least as deserving of protection as the latter. The plurality opin-
ion in Casey recognized this point, advancing it as a principal ground for 
its decision to embrace the doctrine of stare decisis and not to overturn 
Roe: 
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, peo-
ple have organized intimate relationships and made choices 
that define their views of themselves and their places in soci-
ety, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that 
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been 
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. 
The Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of 
reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the 
certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered 
their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.86 
83. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (majority opinion). 
84. Id. at 2610. 
85. Tony Mauro, Courtside: Marshall: Scant Mementos, Scattered Clerks, Legal 
Times, July 15, 1991, at 8, 9, quoted in Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 129. 
86. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
But see Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent and the Constitution: A Comment on 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 11, 18-32 
(1992) (criticizing Casey plurality's approach to stare decisis). 
Given Justice Rehnquist's narrow view of protected reliance interests, see supra 
notes 82-85 and accompanying text, it is not surprising that in his dissent in Casey he 
criticized the plurality's protection of this reliance interest. He wrote: 
As the joint opinion apparently agrees, any traditional notion of reliance is not 
applicable here .... The joint opinion thus turns to what can only be described 
as an unconventional-and unconvincing-notion of reliance, a view based on 
the surmise that the availability of abortion since Roe has led to "two decades of 
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Courts have also protected reliance interests in deciding cases con-
cerning constitutional torts. Government officials are protected from 
liability when their actions are consistent with then-existing judicial in-
terpretations, even if those interpretations subsequently change. Thus, 
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,87 the Court held "government officials perform-
ing discretionary functions [] generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known."88 According to the Harlow majority, the costs of 
not shielding government officials from tort liability include "distrac-
tion ... from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary ac-
tion, and deterrence of able people from public service."89 
Finally, reliance interests have been protected when courts have 
prospectively overruled preceding judicial decisions (or, to put it an-
other way, when they have applied the doctrine of non-retroactivity). 
When courts prospectively overrule an earlier decision, they refrain 
from applying the new law to events that predate its announcement. As 
Chief Justice Burger wrote in his plurality opinion in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,90 nonretroactivity reflects the notion that "statutory or even 
judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in 
making their decisions and in shaping their conduct."91 
The original jurisprudential basis for the opposing doctrine that a 
decision on constitutionality must be applied retroactively is evidenced 
by the Supreme Court's decision in Norton v. Shelby County.92 (This is 
the case that the Maryland Supreme Court invoked, in the language we 
have previously quoted from Johnson v. State, to explain why legislators 
do not always repeal statutes that are found unconstitutional.)93 Norton 
involved a suit by bondholders who sought to enforce payments of 
bonds issued by the Shelby County Board of Commissioners. The 
Commissioners had been appointed pursuant to a state statute that the 
economic and social developments" that would be undercut if the error of Roe 
were recognized. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2861-62 (citations omitted) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
87. 457 u.s. 800 (1982). 
88. ld. at 818; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 534-35 (1985) (although 
his actions violated Fourth Amendment, former Attorney General entitled to qualified 
immunity; Court observes that, at time of Attorney General's actions, two district court 
opinions suggested they were legal); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-95 (1984) 
(noting that defendant's conduct was constitutional under law of circuit as reason for 
granting qualified immunity). See generally Fallo & Meltzer, supra note 58, at 1749-53 
(discussing qualified immunity in constitutional tort actions). 
89. 457 U.S. at 816. But see Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 
Yale LJ. 1425, 1485-88 (1987) (criticizing granting immunity for government officials 
as removing necessary check). 
90. 411 u.s. 192 (1973). 
91. Id. at 199 (plurality opinion). 
92. 118 u.s. 425 (1886). 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. 
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Tennessee Supreme Court found-after the bonds were issued-to be 
violative of the state constitution. In rejecting the bondholders' claims, 
United States Supreme Court Justice Field asserted: "An unconstitu-
tional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it af-
fords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as 
inoperative as though it had never been passed. "94 The bondholders 
thus had no cognizable claim because, from a legal point of view, the 
bond-issuing authority had never existed. Norton came to stand for a 
proposition that was as applicable to overruling decisions as to the ef-
fect of judicial holdings of statutory unconstitutionality: any reliance 
on the law as it appeared prior to the ultimate judicial ruling would not 
be protected.95 
There were a few nineteenth century cases in which courts, re-
jecting the implications of Norton, applied their decisions prospec-
tively,96 but frequent use of the doctrine of prospective overruling 
began only after it was championed by Benjamin Cardozo.97 In his 
1921 book, The Nature of the judicial Process, Cardozo wrote: 
[I]n the vast majority of cases the retrospective effect of judge-
made law is felt either to involve no hardship or only such 
hardship as is inevitable where no rule has been declared. I 
think it is significant that when the hardship is felt to be too 
great or to be unnecessary, retrospective operation is with-
held. Take the cases where a court of final appeal has declared 
a statute void, and afterwards, reversing itself, declares the 
statute valid. Intervening transactions have been governed by 
the first decision. What shall be said of the validity of such 
transactions when the decision is overruled? Most courts in a 
spirit of realism have held that the operation of the statute has 
been suspended in the interval. It may be hard to square such 
a ruling with abstract dogmas and definitions. When so much 
else that a court does, is done with retroactive force, why draw 
the line here? The answer is, I think, that the line is drawn 
here, because the injustice and oppression of a refusal to draw 
it would be so great as to be intolerable.98 
Having argued as a scholar for prospective overruling, Cardozo as 
94. 118 U.S. at 442. 
95. See Oliver P. Field, supra note 58, at 1-2; Plave, supra note 54, at 115. 
96. See Schaefer, supra note 26, at 2 (citing Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 
(1848)). In addition, in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (l Wall.) 175 (1863), and 
related municipal bond cases, the Supreme Court ruled on constitutional grounds that 
states could not give overruling decisions retroactive effect if that would cause the 
impairment of vested or contractual rights. See generally Walter V. Schaefer, The 
Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631, 
631-41 (1967) (discussing early cases and scholarly arguments concerning prospective 
application of decisions). 
97. See Schaefer, supra note 26, at 3. 
98. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 146-47 (1921) 
(citations omitted). 
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a Justice pronounced it constitutional in Great Northern Railway Co. v. 
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co . . 99 The Montana Supreme Court in a 1921 
decision had held that shippers could recover the overcharge for exces-
sive rates. Sunburst then sued Great Northern Railway to recover such 
an overcharge. The Montana Supreme Court overruled the decision 
that would have authorized Sunburst's recovery, but also elected not to 
apply that result retroactively. Thus, Sunburst prevailed because the 
Court applied the rule established in the earlier case. But the Court 
also found that rule inapplicable to future claimants. The railroad con-
tended that the Montana Supreme Court decision violated due process. 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Cardozo stated: 
We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the sub-
ject [of whether a new rule must be applied retroactively]. A 
state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may 
make a choice for itself between the principle of forward oper-
ation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions 
of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the 
less for intermediate transactions. Indeed there are cases inti-
mating, too broadly that it must give them that effect; but never 
has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them if it pleases, 
whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted. 100 
The doctrine of prospective overruling assumed new prominence 
in 1965 with the Supreme Court's decision in Linkletter v. Walker. 101 In 
Linkletter, the Court decided not to give full retroactive effect to its deci-
sion in Mapp v. Ohio 102 that state courts had to exclude evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Two years later, in 
Stovall v. Denno, 103 the Court specified the factors to be used in deter-
mining when a decision should be retroactive: "(a) the purpose to be 
served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law en-
forcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the 
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new 
standards." 104 
The Stovall test influenced the Supreme Court's formulation in 
99. 287 u.s. 358, 364 (1932). 
100. ld. (citation omitted). 
101. 381 U.S. 618 (1965), overruled by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320-28 
(1987). 
102. 367 u.s. 643, 654-55 (1961). 
103. 388 u.s. 293 (1967). 
104. Id. at 297. Although it has been extended to civil cases, this test is no longer 
applied in the criminal context. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) 
(complete retroactive application of new law to cases pending on direct review). For 
discussion of Griffith, see infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text. As Griffith 
indicates, prospective overruling has provoked controversy among members of the 
Court and it has not been consistently applied. The Justices have disagreed as to when 
the technique should be used and, more fundamentally, as to whether it is legitimate. 
The relevant case law and criticism are discussed infra at notes 155-140 and 
accompanying text; that part of the Article also presents our defense of prospective 
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Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson 105 of the approach to be employed in the civil 
context to determine whether a decision should be retroactively 
applied: 
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must estab-
lish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past pre-
cedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an 
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly fore-
shadowed. Second, it has been stressed that "we must ... 
weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the 
prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, 
and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its 
operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by 
retroactive application, for "[ w ]here a decision of this Court 
could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retro-
actively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'in-
justice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." 106 
Chevron Oil involved a civil statute, rather than the Constitution. In 
American Trucking Ass 'ns v. Smith, 107 however, a four-member plurality of 
the Court, led by Justice O'Connor, held that the Chevron Oil test gov-
erned when the overruling decision reversed an opinion interpreting 
the Constitution. In applying Chevron Oil, Justice O'Connor justified 
prospective overruling as a means to avoid hurting those who had re-
lied on the prior decision: "When the Court concludes that a law-
changing decision should not be applied retroactively, its decision is 
usually based on its perception that such application would have a 
harsh and disruptive effect on those who relied on prior law." 108 
overruling (and, specifically, of prospective overruling in the statutory context) as an 
exercise of the judicial remedial function. 
It should be noted that in the area of habeas corpus, the Court has ruled that a 
petition that either rests on or seeks enunciation of a new rule of law will normally be 
dismissed. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989); see also Fallon & Metzer, 
supra note 58, at 1746-49 (discussing Teague and subsequent case law). But see Marc 
M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Courts after Teague v. Lane, 69 
N.C. L. Rev. 371, 395-99 (1991) (providing a narrow reading of Teague). Habeas, 
however, raises unique issues. Thus, Justice Harlan, despite his criticism of prospective 
overruling in cases involving direct review, believed that the fact that habeas was an 
extraordinary remedy and the importance of finality in criminal convictions meant that 
new rules should generally not be applied in the habeas context. See Fallon & Meltzer, 
supra note 58, at 1743-44 (discussing Justice Harlan's view of habeas and new rules). 
105. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
106. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted). For Justice White's broad endorsement of 
the Chevron test, see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, Ill S. Ct. 2439, 2449 
(1991) (White, J., concurring); for Justice O'Connor's, see id. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting); see also American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191 (1990) 
(plurality opinion). 
107. 496 u.s. 167 (1990). 
108. Id. at 191. 
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C. Prospective Overruling and Political Reliance 
There is thus ample precedent in the law for the notion that judi-
cial decisions should protect at least some reliance interests. Is political 
reliance an interest that should be protected, and if so, how should pro-
tection be achieved? 
We recognize that not all reliance interests merit protection. 
Notwithstanding justice Rehnquist's comments to the contrary, a crimi-
nal might well argue against a change in the evidentiary rules on the 
grounds that she had, in fact, taken the current rules into account in 
deciding to commit a crime. 109 It seems unlikely, however, that we 
would want to shield her from the consequences of the rule change; the 
purpose of rules that limit the kind of evidence that the state can intro-
duce is not to empower the criminal, but to restrain the constable. In 
contrast, there are compelling reasons for encouraging political 
reliance. 
To promote efficient political activity and to encourage deference 
to judicial decision-making, the judiciary should wish to encourage 
majoritarian bodies to interpret the Constitution in the same way as it 
does. Revival encourages what is in effect a form of legislative nonac-
quiescence. It gives critics of a judicial decision a strong incentive to 
oppose repeal of the invalidated statute and to work for the passage of 
legislation inconsistent with that decision. In the vast majority of cases, 
the battles over "unconstitutional" legislation will entail a squandering 
of political resources. Because our legal system attaches a heavy weight 
to precedent, relatively few invalidating decisions will be overturned. 
Thus, a significant amount of legislative energy will be devoted to mat-
ters of no practical importance. At the same time, revival encourages 
political actors to behave as if judicial decisions are transitory in nature 
and thus undermines faith in their finality. 
Revival of previously invalidated statutes penalizes those who make 
good faith judgments in reliance on the rule of law enunciated in the 
invalidating decision. As previously pointed out, statutes that are at 
odds with the invalidating decision may remain on the books or be 
passed when, in the absence of the invalidating decision, they would 
have been repealed or defeated. While the law protects reliance inter-
ests out of a deep concern for fairness, in the belief that those who 
structure lawful activity aroundjudicial pronouncements should not be 
hurt by subsequent judicial decisions to alter the rule of law, non pro-
tection of political reliance leads to outcomes that are both consequent-
ial and unfair. 
A variant on Weeks 110 illustrates the unfairness that can ensue when 
109. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
110. Weeks v. Connick, 733 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990). 
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statutes are revived. Let us assume that Casey 111 had reversed Roe 11 2 
and that Weeks had been brought after Roe had been reversed. Revival 
in this context would have rendered the 134-year-old statute-which 
may well have been on the books only because it was unenforced-au-
tomatically enforceable. Pursuant to the terms of the statute, any dis-
trict attorney anywhere in the state could have prosecuted any doctor 
performing abortions in the state for a felony carrying a ten-year jail 
sentence. The threat of such prosecution could have closed all the 
abortion clinics in the state, forcing the physician, nurse, and counsel-
lor employed there to seek other employment. At some point after en-
forcement began the statute might have been repealed or modified. 
But the disruption caused by enforcement would have had long-term 
consequences; eventual repeal could not restore the status quo ante. 113 
There are, then, important reasons to protect political reliance. 
But how can such protection be achieved? The answer to this question 
lies in extending the doctrine of prospective overruling, which is cur-
rently limited to events that predate judicial announcement of the new 
rule of law, making it applicable to statutes whose passage predates the 
judicial announcement of the new rule of law. In other words, courts 
should be able to use this doctrine in evaluating statutes passed before 
the overruling decision. Such prospective overruling would deal pre-
cisely with the harms associated with the failure to protect political reli-
ance. It would allow courts to prevent the enforcement of statutes that 
may not reflect current majoritarian will. It would prevent the squan-
dering of political resources. And it would bolster rather than under-
mine judicial authority, ensuring the fair treatment of those who base 
their behavior on judicial interpretations of the law. 114 
Ill. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
112. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
113. Another way in which the statute would have had a chilling effect stems from 
the fact that by definition, the Louisiana legislators who had passed the statute were 
unfamiliar with subsequent developments. Thus, the 1855 law did not speak to matters 
such as whether contraceptives like IUDs that prevented implantation are abortifacients 
and hence subject to severe criminal penalties. Until the reach of the law was clarified 
(or until the law itself was repealed), then, use of IUDs might have been substantially 
discouraged. 
As previously noted, see supra note 13, after Weeks the Louisiana legislature 
amended and partially re-enacted its criminal abortion statute. The provision 
concerning abortifacients, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:88 (West 1986), was not re-enacted. 
Under the post-Weeks statute, doctors who perform abortions in cases other than rape or 
incest or to save the life of the mother are subject to criminal prosecution. See La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 14:87 (West Supp. 1993). This is a narrower statute than the original, 
which did not contain these exceptions. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87 (West 1986). 
114. In this regard, it is possible to imagine the following counterargument against 
prospective overruling: Prospective overruling will destroy the incentives and the 
opportunity for legislatures to engage in a dialogue with courts about whether the 
invalidating decision should be overturned. Adherents of this argument would ask: why 
would a legislature pass a statute that is unenforceable under the invalidating decision? 
If the legislature has no incentive to do so, won't that undercut the court's ability to have 
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Prospective overruling is best conceptualized as an exercise of a 
court's remedial powers designed to protect those who have relied on 
judicial pronouncements. It is analogous to the constitutional tort 
cases that hold that a government actor who relies on official pro-
nouncements will be shielded from harm if those pronouncements are 
in error or if the law changes. 115 The relevant pronouncement in a 
revival case is the initial invalidating decision; the remedy is to deny 
enforcement of the once-unconstitutional statute unless it is repassed. 
It is also possible to view prospective overruling as a choice of law 
doctrine, rather than as an exercise of a court's remedial powers. 
Under this conception of prospective overruling, courts assessing the 
constitutionality of a statute must decide whether to apply "new" con-
stitutional law or "old" constitutional law; prospective overruling 
would involve application of the "old" law. This approach accords with 
that adopted by Justice O'Connor in her plurality decision in American 
Trucking in determining which law to apply to events that preceded the 
overruling decision. "In those relatively rare circumstances where es-
tablished precedent is overruled," she stated, "the doctrine of nonret-
roactivity allows a court ... to avoid 'jolting the expectations of parties 
to a transaction.' " 116 
The argument for the choice oflaw approach is strongest when the 
"new law" reflects a judicial determination that the meaning of the 
Constitution has changed because of changes in societal circumstances, 
rather than a judicial determination that its initial holding was in error. 
The plurality opinion in Casey suggests that it would be possible to read 
a vehicle to revisit the invalidating decision? Also, won't prospective overruling deny 
legislatures the means they need to signal the courts that a particular statute enjoys 
current m~oritarian support? The answer to this argument is that the possibility of 
prospective overruling gives those who oppose an invalidating decision adequate 
incentive and opportunity to engage in such dialogue with the judiciary. By passing a 
statute that is unenforceable under the invalidating decision, the legislature can provide 
the court with the opportunity to overrule its invalidating decision. Even if the 
"unconstitutional" statute has to be repassed after the overturning decision to be 
enforceable, there is a strong reason for its proponents to pass it, because it provides a 
vehicle for reversal. 
115. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 4 72 U.S. 511 (1985) (holding Attorney General 
immune from liability for authorizing warrantless wiretaps because unclear that they 
were unconstitutional at the time of authorization); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 
(1984) (state officials enjoy qualified immunity unless actions violate constitutional right 
clearly established at time of challenged conduct); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 
( 1982) (government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded 
from liability to the extent that their actions do not violate clear constitutional or 
statutory rights). 
116. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 196 (1990) (plurality 
opinion) (O'Connor, j.) (citation omitted); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. 
Georgia, Ill S. Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991) (O'Connor,]., dissenting) (Chevron Oil sets forth 
the process by which the Supreme Court determines "whether the new law or the old is 
to apply to conduct occurring before the law-changing decision"). 
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the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 117 overruling Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 11 B in this light: 
The Plessy Court considered "the underlying fallacy of the 
plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the en-
forced separation of the two races stamps the colored race 
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race 
chooses to put that construction upon it." 
The Court in Brown addressed these facts of life by ob-
serving that whatever may have been the understanding in 
Plessy's time of the power of segregation to stigmatize those 
who were segregated with a "badge of inferiority," it was clear 
by 1954 that legally sanctioned segregation had just such an 
effect, to the point that racially separate public educational fa-
cilities were deemed inherently unequal. . . . While we think 
Plessy was wrong the day it was decided, we must also recog-
nize that the Plessy Court's explanation for its decision was so 
clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 
that the decision to re-examine Plessy was on this ground alone 
not only justified but required. . . . In constitutional adjudica-
tion as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose 
new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could 
accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to 
the Court's constitutional duty. 119 
If Roe 120 were ever to be overturned, a similar argument could be 
made. Dean Calabresi has recently suggested that Roe may be best un-
derstood as a decision that involved the protection of women as a 
group that had been largely excluded from the legislative process and 
that the Court might legitimately revise or reverse Roe if it determined 
that this were no longer the case. 121 Thus, factual changes would be 
the occasion for reversing the initial decision, and the initial decision 
would not have been erroneous when it was made. 
Our point here is not to argue for specific readings of Roe or Plessy. 
It is, rather, to suggest that when a decision is overruled because mate-
rial societal facts have changed, the argument for nonrevival on choice 
oflaw grounds is compelling. A choice oflaw approach would render a 
statute enforceable only if it were enacted at a time when the factual 
preconditions for the statute to be constitutional were satisfied. Analo-
117. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
118. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
119. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2813 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(citations omitted). 
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
121. See Calabresi, supra note 78, at 146-48; see also Guido Calabresi, Ideals, 
Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law 97,99-101, 108-14 (1985) (antidiscrimination and Roe); 
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569, 1618-39 (1979) 
(same). 
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gously, when a constitutional amendment is passed that permits the 
legislature to adopt a statute that it could not previously adopt, the case 
law has consistently indicated that-unless the amendment is intended 
to be retroactive-a statute that was unconstitutional prior to the 
amendment will be enforceable only if it is repassed after the amend-
ment is ratified.l22 Specifically, in the leading case on point, Newberry v. 
United States, 123 the Supreme Court found that a subsequently passed 
constitutional amendment would not make a statute that predated the 
amendment constitutional because "[a]n after-acquired power can not 
ex proprio vigore validate a statute void when enacted." 124 Here, the 
same principle would be applied when it is the meaning of the Consti-
tution, rather than one of its component elements, that changes: the 
legislature cannot pass a statute that exceeds its powers; if the meaning 
of the Constitution changes so that the powers of the legislature ex-
pand, legislation once beyond the legislature's scope but now permissi-
ble must be repassed to be enforceable. 
In the limited context discussed above, the choice of law approach 
is based on the idea that the meaning of the Constitution changes as 
society changes. Generally, however, the choice of law approach neces-
sarily (if implicitly) rests on the idea that the Constitution means simply 
what the judiciary says it means. When the judiciary changes its mind, 
122. See, e.g., Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 254 (1921) (Seventeenth 
Amendment could not validate section 8 of Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which was 
void when enacted); Banaz v. Smith, 65 P. 309, 310 (Ca. 1901) (unless expressly 
provided, a state constitutional amendment cannot give life to void provisions in a city 
charter); Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Oneida, Ltd., 75 S.E.2d 161, 164 (Ga. 1953), cert. 
denied, 346 U.S. 823 (1953) (citing with approval cases holding that a constitutional 
amendment cannot validate a previously enacted statute); Dullam v. Willson, 19 N.W. 
112, 114 (Mich. 1884) (a statute that was held unconstitutional and thus void could not 
empower the Governor to remove an institute trustee even after the constitution had 
been amended lifting the original objection); State ex rei. Rogers v. Swanson, 219 
N.W.2d 726, 729 (Neb. 1974) (statute authorizing tuition grants for private school 
attendance was invalid when passed and could not be revived by a constitutional 
amendment regardless of whether that amendment might authorize such action); see 
also NormanJ. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction§ 2.07, at 37 (rev. ed. 1985) 
(stating rule). The amendment, however, need not explicitly state that it is to have 
retroactive effect, so long as the intent to have such an effect is apparent. For example, 
the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, among other reasons, to establish a clear 
constitutional basis for the previously enacted Civil Rights Act of 1866. See William E. 
Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 104 
(1988) (arguing that section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was added in part for this 
purpose); RobertJ. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 910 (1986) (observing that 
"congressional Republicans ... acted to incorporate the Civil Rights Act into the 
Constitution through the first section of the fourteenth amendment"); see also Akhil R. 
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale LJ. 1193, 1244-46 
(1992) (discussing the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866). 
123. 256 u.s. 234 (1921). 
124. Id. at 254. 
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the meaning of the Constitution changes. The most profound critique 
of prospective overruling-Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Desist 
v. United States 125 and his dissenting and concurring opinion in Mackey 
v. United States 126-was based on the notion that this view ofjudiciallaw 
making is illegitimate. 127 This critique is even more compelling in the 
125. 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan's view 
was subsequently endorsed by the Court in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-29 
(1987) (citing Justice Harlan's position in Desist). 
126. 401 U.S. 667,675-702 (1971) (Harlan,]., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
127. Concern that prospective overruling amounts to judicial law making animates 
one part of the current Court and helps explain the Court's inconsistent application of 
prospective overruling. For example, this concern played an important role in the 
Court's decision in Griffith to overturn Stovall and apply new law retroactively in criminal 
cases on direct review. For the liberals on the Court, the result in Griffith was desirable 
primarily because the decision guaranteed equal treatment of similarly situated 
defendants. Justices Scalia and Powell joined the majority because they equated 
prospective overruling with judicial law making. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 58, at 
1745. 
This concern also helps explain the complicated result in James B. Beam Distilling 
Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). At issue was whether a new rule of law, if it was 
applied in the case in which the new rule was announced, had to be applied retroactively 
to all other cases. In other words, the case presented the question of whether selective 
prospectivity in civil cases was legitimate. The three dissenters-Justices O'Connor and 
Kennedy and ChiefJustice Rehnquist-urged the choice of law analysis discussed above 
and contended that the fact that the new rule had been applied in the case in which it 
was announced did not mean that it had to be applied in all other cases. See id. at 2451 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority held that full retroactivity was necessary, but 
did so for a range of reasons. Justices Souter and Stevens found that the need for equal 
treatment of similarly situated parties required full retroactivity, but they did not 
challenge the legitimacy of full prospectivity. See id. at 2441-48 (Souter, J ., with one 
Justice joining the opinion and four Justices concurring in the judgment). (The previous 
year Justice Stevens had endorsed prospective overruling as an appropriate 
constitutional remedy. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 223 
( 1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).) Justice White concurred on the grounds that there was 
"no precedent in civil cases [for] applying a new rule to the parties in the case but not to 
others similarly situated." james B. Beam Distilling Co., Ill S. Ct. at 2448 (White, J ., 
concurring). He specifically stated, however, that courts could prospectively overrule 
their precedent, so long as they did not apply the new rule of law to the party in the case 
where the new rule was announced. See id. at 2449. Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and 
Marshall concurred on the grounds that prospective overruling was always illegitimate 
judicial law making. See id. at 2449-50 (Biackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2450-51 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
Finally, that concern was present in the majority opinion and in Justice Scalia's 
concurrence in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993), the Court's 
most recent confrontation with the prospective overruling question. The Court in 
Harper rejected selective prospectivity in civil cases, suggesting that it was a 
" 'legislat[ive]' prerogative" to determine that a new rule oflaw should be applied only 
prospectively. See id. at 2516 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)). 
Indeed, dicta in the majority opinion suggest that a new rule of a federal law must be 
applied retroactively. See, e.g., id. at 2516 ("basic norms of constitutional adjudication" 
inform rejection of prospectivity in criminal context) (citation omitted); id. at 2517 
(absence of "constitutional authority ... to disregard current law"). But see id. at 
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context of prospective overruling when applied to statutes, as opposed 
to events. In the statutory context, prospective overruling based on 
choice oflaw notions would mean that a judicial decision that the court 
subsequently decided to overturn would nonetheless provide a basis 
for judicial invalidation of a statute that the legislature had passed in 
accordance with its view of the Constitution. Such a result necessarily 
implies that the judiciary alone has the power to determine what the 
Constitution means. Indeed, it implies that the judiciary's errors can 
trump legislative views of the Constitution that the judiciary subse-
quently determines were correct. Such an expansive view of the judi-
cial role is inconsistent with our constitutional heritage, beginning with 
Marbury v. Madison.12s 
Viewing prospective overruling as a remedy, however, does not in-
2527-28 (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (countering implication in majority opinion that it is 
improper to give new rule of law only prospective application with citation to cases in 
which new rules were given purely prospective effect). Justice Scalia (who, in addition to 
filing a concurrence, was one of the five votes making up the majority) similarly 
concluded that the decision to make a new rule of law operate only prospectively was 
legislative, rather than judicial, in nature. See id. at 2520-24. 
The response to this critique is set forth in the text: if prospective overruling is 
conceptualized as a remedy, then it does not involve judicial law-making; it involves, 
instead, the exercise of a traditional judicial function. See infra notes 129-132 and 
accompanying text. 
128. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The relevant scholarly literature is vast, but for 
leading examples of academic thought expounding on the principle that in our system of 
judicial review, beginning with Marbury, the judiciary is not the sole authoritative source 
of constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous 
Branch 263-64 (1962) (discussing the view that Congress should not enact a bill it 
considers unconstitutional); Robert L. Clinton, Marbury u. Madison and Judicial Review 
98-99 ( 1989) (arguing that Marbury does not attribute exclusive power to interpret the 
Constitution to the Court and does not deny the legislative power to engage in 
constitutional interpretation); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 23-42 
(2d ed. 1988) (arguing that "a variety of actors" possess the power to interpret the 
Constitution); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment 
on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 25 n.155 (1964) 
(pointing out that Marshall's assertion of judicial authority to interpret the Constitution 
in Marbury does not stand for judicial exclusiveness in constitutional interpretation); 
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1008 
(1965) (quoting Lincoln's First Inaugural address as an example of the view that the 
policy of the government is not determined by the Court's decisions). For examples of 
the competing scholarly view, holding that Marbury embodies the position that the 
Constitution means what the Court interprets it to mean and nothing more, see, e.g., 
Edmond Cahn, An American Contribution in Supreme Court and Supreme Law 1, 25 
(Edmond Cahn ed., 1954) (Marbury begins a "colloquy" between Court and people in 
which the Court asserts, "You live under a Constitution but the Constitution is what we 
say it is .... "); Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Laws 37 
(1967) ("[,Harbury• reflects] a theory of the judges as the only true guardians of the 
permanent will of the people which is incorporated in the Constitution"). The Supreme 
Court opinion which arguably asserts absolute judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation is Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 18 (1958) (declaring that "the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"). For a defense of 
this approach, see Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper l'. 
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vo1ve accepting such a broad judicial role. Seen in this light, prospec-
tive overruling does not imply that a statute once held unconstitutional 
was in fact unconstitutional, even though the Court subsequently deter-
mined that the initial judgment of invalidity was wrong. To support 
prospective overruling as a remedy is to make the much lesser claim 
that, when a court changes its mind about a rule of constitutional law, it 
can take the steps needed to protect those who relied on its initial 
determination. 
Conceiving of prospective overruling as a remedy is hardly novel. 
Writing for four dissenters in American Trucking, Justice Stevens pro-
posed treating prospective overruling as part of the law of remedies 
designed to protect reliance. 129 The idea can be traced back to Justice 
Harlan, 130 and it has recently been convincingly argued for by Profes-
sors Fallon and Meltzer.I3I 
When viewed as a remedy, the technique of prospective overruling 
is concerned with the consequences that should follow from the relative 
unpredictability of a judicial decision that overturns a previous judicial 
decision. 132 With respect to statutes, one problem associated with rela-
tive unpredictability is political reliance. Political actors allocate their 
political capital based on the assumption that the initial judicial deci-
sion is unlikely to be overturned. If political reliance with respect to a 
specific statute is sufficiently compelling to justify shaping a judicial 
remedy, only one remedy appears adequate: denying enforcement of 
the previously unconstitutional statute unless it is repassed. No other 
remedy will avoid seriously disadvantaging those who relied on the ini-
tial invalidating decision. 
But should courts be able to engage in selective prospectivity? 
That is, if a court in the overruling decision evaluates a statute under 
the rule of law announced in that decision, must all other statutes be 
evaluated using that new rule of law-or can the old rule of law be 
applied in other cases? 133 These questions appear particularly signifi-
cant in the wake of Casey, since the Court there applied the new rule of 
law to the Pennsylvania statute at issue in the case. Thus, if there is no 
selective prospective overruling in the statutory context, the rule of law 
enunciated in Casey, having been applied to one statute, is applicable to 
all other statutes on the books. 
Although the Supreme Court once sanctioned selective prospectiv-
Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387, 403-ll. But see Tribe, supra, at 35 (arguing 
that Cooper need not be read as embodying such a broad assertion of judicial authority). 
129. See 496 U.S. at 221-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
130. See United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286,296-97 (1970) (Harlan, 
J., concurring); see also 496 U.S. at 223-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing concurring 
opinion of Justice Harlan in Estate of Donnell)' as support for view of prospective 
overruling as remedy). 
131. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 58, at 1758-77. 
132. See id. at 1768. 
133. For further discussion of this doctrine, see supra note 127. 
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ity in criminal cases, 134 more recently, it has rejected this doctrine, find-
ing that it violates the principle of treating like cases alike. 135 The 
Court has never applied selective prospectivity in the civil context, and 
in the recent case of Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 136 it specifi-
cally rejected the doctrine. There appears to be a two-fold rationale for 
that decision. First, the Court in Harper suggested that only legislatures 
properly have the freedom "to make rules of law retroactive or pro-
spective as [they] see fit"; 137 the nature of the judicial function requires 
retroactive application of new rules. 138 Second, " 'selective application 
of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated [parties] 
the same.' " 139 
But if prospective overruling is viewed as remedial, the court that 
adopts it is not, in fact, usurping legislative functions; it is merely decid-
ing, as is consistent with judicial practice in a range of other contexts, 
to fashion a remedy capable of protecting those who have relied on its 
decisions. Moreover, the risk of treating similar cases disparately does 
not arise when prospective overruling is applied to statutes. Similarly 
situated litigants will receive the same treatment so long as the applica-
tion of a particular statute is consistent. 140 
134. See Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1975); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293, 296-301 (1967);johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-35 (1966). 
135. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 327-28 (1987) ("actual inequity ... 
results when only one of many similarly situated defendants receives the benefit of the 
new rule" (citation omitted)). 
136. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993). 
137. Id. at 2516. 
138. This argument suggests that a rule of pure prospectivity would also be 
illegitimate. See supra note 127. 
139. 113 S. Ct. at 2516 (quoting Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323). 
140. In addition, the reliance interest will vary from statute to statute and thus it is 
appropriate to treat some litigants differently from others. For example, as will be 
subsequently discussed (see infra part II.D), the reliance interest for a post-Webster 
abortion statute would not be the same as with a pre-Webster statute. Courts thus should 
have the ability to apply the new rule oflaw to some, but not all, statutes passed prior to 
its announcement. This would not violate the principle of treating similarly situated 
things alike since from the relevant perspective-that of the degree of reliance-not all 
statutes are similarly situated. Thus, the better view is that the fact that the statute in 
Casey is now enforceable should not mean that other abortion regulation statutes that 
satisfy the Casey test will be enforceable without being repassed. Moreover, if courts 
were to adopt the doctrine of prospective overruling in the statutory context, there 
would be a particularly compelling case for not holding that failure to apply that 
doctrine in Casey would bar application of this technique to other abortion statutes. Not 
only was the technique not considered in Casey, the technique had not even been 
advanced as a theory at that time. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Court 
did not make a considered choice not to overrule the statute prospectively. Thus, the 
Casey situation is different from that in Harper. The Court in the overruling decision that 
preceded Harper, Davis v. Michigan Dep't of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), had 
available to it the doctrine of prospective overruling and elected not to apply it. See 
Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2513-16 (discussing Davis). 
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D. Determining When to Overrule Statutes Prospectively 
Expanding the doctrine of prospective overruling would not re-
quire judging all statutes passed prior to the judiciary's promulgation 
of a new rule by the old rule. The Chevron Oil test-which the Court has 
enunciated as its guide in determining when prospective overruling is 
called for 141-remains an appropriate guide as the doctrine of prospec-
tive overruling is extended to the statutory context. Because of the 
political reliance problem, in evaluating statutes, the critical prong of 
the Chevron Oil test is the third one: "[w]here a decision of this Court 
could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, 
there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' 
by a holding of nonretroactivity." 142 Whether "injustice or hardship" 
mandate prospective application will turn on a fact-specific inquiry; we 
propose that this inquiry take into account three factors. 
The first factor to be considered is the amount of time that elapsed 
between the invalidating decision and the overruling decision. The 
greater the passage of time, the more likely it is that political actors 
have relied on the finality of the judicial decision. For example, the 
case for political reliance is particularly compelling with respect to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 since more than one hundred years have 
passed since the Act was invalidated. In contrast, if the Supreme Court 
overturns a statute and then reverses itself the following month, the 
case for political reliance is unpersuasive. Hepburn 143 and the Legal 
Tender Cases 144 exemplify this situation. Hepburn was decided on 
February 7, 1870; on March 25, 1870, the Attorney General asked the 
Court to hear another legal tender case in order to reconsider its deci-
sion; on April 1, 1870, the Court acceded to that request, agreeing to 
hear the Legal Tender Cases } 4 5 
The second factor to be considered concerns the extent to which it 
was clear that the statute at issue was unconstitutional under the invali-
dating decision. If the statute at issue was the statute involved in the 
invalidating decision, then the answer is obvious. For example, Roe 
concerned Texas's criminal abortion statute; there could be no ques-
tion that that statute was unconstitutional under the rule of law enunci-
ated in Roe-since that was the express holding of the Court. 146 It can 
also be clear, however, that statutes other than those explicitly and di-
rectly at issue in the invalidating decision were unconstitutional under 
141. See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text. 
142. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971) (citations omitted). 
143. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). See discussion supra 
notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
144. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). See discussion supra 
notes 32-39 and accompanying text. 
145. See Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme 
Court and the Legal Tender Cases (Installment 2), 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1128 (1941). 
146. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
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the rule of law that decision established. For example, it is apparent 
that, under the rule established in Roe, statutes that criminalize any 
abortion except an abortion to save the mother's life are unconstitu-
tional. Roe says as much. 147 In contrast, the more the invalidating deci-
sion is ambiguous or its contours unclear, the less the equities favor 
political actors who assumed that the statute was unconstitutional. 
The third factor is the relative timing of the statute's passage and 
the relevant judicial decisions. As previously discussed, an invalidating 
decision skews the political dynamic. A statute passed prior to the inval-
idating decision may not be repealed after that decision despite the fact 
that it no longer has majoritarian support. Similarly, a statute may be 
passed after the invalidating decision even though it does not enjoy 
majoritarian support. When a court, however, signals that it is recon-
sidering an invalidating decision, then the political process is no longer 
skewed: political actors know, or should know, that a statute they 
pass-even though invalid under current case law-may be upheld. In 
such circumstances, political reliance is unlikely to exist, and, if it does 
exist, should not be rewarded. To take a concrete example: Webster 
altered the relevant political context, for five members of the Court ar-
guably signalled (albeit in different ways) that Roe was in danger of be-
ing overruled.l48 Webster, therefore, placed political actors on notice 
that they could not rely on Roe. Political developments reflected the 
change in judicial climate: as previously noted, after Webster, the 
number of state legislative bodies that supported keeping abortion 
legal rose from twenty-three to fifty .149 
This analysis suggests the following typology. Let us call Adams the 
invalidating decision; Baker the decision that signals that a court is re-
considering Adams; Cobb the decision that overrules Adams. The third 
factor that we have identified as relevant to the determination of 
whether there has been political reliance meriting protection would 
counsel that, after Cobb, statutes inconsistent with the rule in Adams and 
which were passed prior to Adams would have to be repassed to be en-
forceable. The same is true of statutes passed between Adams and 
Baker. But post-Baker and pre-Cobb statutes would not have to be re-
passed to be enforceable. Prospective overruling would thus effectively 
serve to protect political reliance, ensuring that those who take judicial 
decisions seriously and structure their political activities in accordance 
147. "A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from 
criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to 
pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. 
148. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (three-
member plurality opinion); id. at 525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 532 (Scalia, 
]., concurring). 
149. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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with such decisions will not be harmed when a court alters its constitu-
tional interpretation. 
III. CURRENT MAJORITIES 
Part II of this Article argued that prospective overruling is appro-
priate in certain circumstances in which political reliance on an invali-
dating decision has skewed the operation of majoritarian decision-
making processes. This Part presents a second theoretical justification 
for the doctrine of prospective overruling of statutes, and a second cat-
egory of cases in which use of the doctrine is appropriate. Our argu-
ment here draws on the insights of Alexander Bickel in his Harvard 
Foreword, The Passive Virtues. In that essay, Bickel highlighted the fact 
that a statute may remain on the books even if it does not enjoy the 
support of a current majority, and he argued that courts should use 
technical devices to force current majoritarian consideration of consti-
tutionally problematic statutes. Our first subpart develops both 
Bickel's ideas and the principal criticisms leveled against the Bickelian 
approach. Our second subpart applies Bickel's ideas to the revival de-
bate. We argue that prospective overruling lacks the weaknesses of the 
judicial tools that Bickel urged courts to apply. More importantly, 
Bickel's arguments make it clear that there is one class of statutes for 
which prospective overruling is particularly appropriate: statutes that 
affect individual liberty. If a statute is found unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it violates individual liberty (or if it is unconstitutional 
under a rule of law enunciated in decisions concerning liberty inter-
ests), it clearly affects constitutionally protected liberty interests, even 
though a subsequent judicial decision may establish a new rule of law 
under which the statute's affect on liberty interests would no longer be 
held to rise to the level of unconstitutionality. The importance our 
constitutional system attaches to the protection of individual liberty in-
dicates that such a statute should be enforceable only if a current ma-
jority, made aware of the relevant constitutional concerns by both the 
invalidating decision and the overruling decision, reaffirms its desire 
for that statute. 
A. The Past Majoritarian Dilemma and Bickel 
In both our national and state systems, in order to be adopted leg-
islation must go through a process that ensures that it has majoritarian, 
if not supermajoritarian, support. Thus, in the federal government 
(and most of the states), to become law the proposed statute must navi-
gate a committee structure that has the capacity to prevent its further 
consideration; it must secure passage by both legislative houses; and, in 
the event of an executive veto, it must garner enough support to over-
ride the veto. 150 
150. This is not to say that a particular bill will always be favored by a majority. A 
1942 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1902 
But once a statute is on the books, the "burden of inertia," 151 to 
use Guido Calabresi's phrase, is on its side. A combination of thirty-
four percent of one house of the legislature and the executive is obvi-
ously sufficient to keep the statute on the books, even if it lacks current 
majoritarian support. Indeed, the committee system is such that a far 
weaker coalition can block repeal. And so a "revived" abortion statute, 
for example, may remain in force despite current majoritarian 
desires .I 52 
Yet the commitment of our system of government to majority rule 
raises the question: Why should the starting point of legislation reflect 
the beliefs of past, rather than current, majorities? There are, of 
course, reasons why, in the normal course of affairs, legislation does 
not automatically expire. Legislative energy is a scarce resource whose 
consequences should not be lightly cast aside.l 53 Moreover, the incen-
tives to pass legislation would be radically undercut if all legislation 
were temporary, and proposed legislation would not receive the atten-
tion it requires. But perhaps most important, with the ordinary statute, 
its ongoing enforcement, combined with the fact that it has not been 
repealed, indicates that it has continuously enjoyed some level of sup-
port. At no point has the majority decided that the statute is both of 
such significance and so erroneous or counterproductive as to warrant 
the expenditure of efforts necessary to repeal it. 
The issue of the extent to which old majorities should be able to 
establish the starting point for current deliberations has been one that 
Americans have debated since at least the time of the ratification de-
bates over the Constitution. Anti-federalists, for example, opposed the 
Constitution in part on the grounds that its flexibility and purported 
ability to adapt to the future was a weakness, not a strength. They 
claimed that the dead hand control that the Constitution represented 
would unfairly burden future generations; better to have a time-bound 
constitution that would be repealed, rather than one that sought to 
constrain governmental decision-making for all time} 54 Even propo-
coalition can be formed in support of a statute comprising both those who actually favor 
it and those who are willing to endorse it in exchange for support on other matters from 
the statute's actual proponents. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and 
Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. LJ. 281, 308-09 nn.140-41 (1989); see also Akhil R. 
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1043, 1083-85 (1988) (less representative Senate can exploit leverage to secure 
House support for statute). 
151. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 164 (1982). 
152. This is equally true whether the current majority desires a statute that is more 
restrictive (assuming it is still within constitutional bounds) or less restrictive than the 
revived statute. 
153. See Hutchinson & Morgan, supra note 64, at 1765 (discussing scarcity of 
legislative time and consequences of that scarcity). 
154. See Michael Lienesch, New Order of the Ages: Time, The Constitution, and 
the Making of Modem American Political Thought 148-50 (1988) (discussing anti-
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nents of the Constitution were concerned about this issue. Thus, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote James Madison: 
[N]o society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a per-
petual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation. 
They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they 
please, during their usufruct. They are masters too of their 
own persons, and consequently may govern them as they 
please. But persons and property make the sum of the objects 
of government. The constitution and the laws of their prede-
cessors extinguished then in their natural course with those 
who gave them being. This could preserve that being till it 
ceased to be itself, and no longer. Every constitution then, 
and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be 
enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right. 155 
Such concerns reemerged in modern legal scholarship through the 
work of Alexander Bickel, and in particular his Harvard Foreword, The 
Passive Virtues. 156 The Passive Virtues reflects Bickel's belief that, as a gen-
eral matter, current majorities have a superior claim to authority in a 
democracy than past majorities. The Passive Virtues also advances the 
related argument that, in constitutional gray areas courts should pro-
mote informed current majoritarian decision-making by forcing consid-
ered majoritarian reevaluation of legislation, rather than simply 
holding it unconstitutional.157 
The section of The Passive Virtues of greatest relevance to the revival 
debate is Bickel's discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Poe v. 
Ullman. 158 At issue in Poe was the constitutionality of Connecticut's 
birth control statute, which made it a misdemeanor for a person to use 
"any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of prevent-
ing conception. " 159 Those who sold or distributed birth control de-
vices could be punished as accessories to a crime. 160 
The birth control statute had been passed in 1879. 161 In the more 
than three-quarters of a century between the time of the Act's passage 
federalist concern that a constitution articulated in broad and flexible language would 
invite oppression). 
155. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 392, 395-96 (Julian Boyd ed., 1958). For a recent 
intellectual history of this letter, see Herbert Sloan, "The Earth Belongs in Usufruct to 
the Living," in Jeffersonian Legacies 281 (PeterS. Onuf ed., 1993). 
156. See Bickel, supra note 22. 
157. Bickel's principal works are: The Least Dangerous Branch (1962); The 
Morality of Consent (1975); Politics and the Warren Court (1965); The Supreme Court 
and the Idea of Progress (1970); The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The 
Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961); and, with Harry H. Wellington, Legislative 
Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev. I (1957). 
158. 367 u.s. 497 (1961). 
159. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-32 ( 1958). 
160. See id. § 54-196. 
161. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 61 & n.98. 
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and the Supreme Court's consideration of it, practically no one simi-
larly situated to appellants-two women whose lives would be endan-
gered by child bearing, the husband of one of the two women, and the 
doctor who wished to advise them on birth control-had been prose-
cuted under the statute. 162 
In Bickel's view, the lack of enforcement suggested that the bill no 
longer had current majoritarian support. "The influences that favor 
the objective of the statute cannot summon sufficient political 
strength-or perhaps they have not the desire-to cause it to be en-
forced; assuming that the consistent enforcement of a law is as much a 
function of the political process as is enactment of it." 163 Nonenforce-
ment was relevant to Bickel because it suggested that relatively little 
weight should be given to the fact that there had not been repeal. He 
wrote: 
It would be foolish, of course, and it would ensure paralysis, to 
expect continual expression of the legislative will through con-
tinual reconsideration of the statutebook. But normal law en-
forcement indicates the continuity of will, because it conduces 
to legislative reconsideration when the dominant opinion 
turns-although greater strength must be mobilized to repeal 
a statute than to resist its enactment. When the law is consist-
ently not enforced, the chance of mustering opposition suffi-
cient to move the legislature is reduced to the vanishing 
point.164 
At the same time, the pro-birth control forces had not been able to 
achieve the end they desired: "The influences which oppose the law 
cannot summon sufficient political strength to cause it to be repealed; 
attempts have been made from 1923 onward, and they have failed." 165 
"[T]he statute does not speak the present will of dominant forces in the 
state," Bickel wrote, "[i]t represents at present a deadlock of wills, from 
which the Court was asked to extricate the state." 166 
The Court in Poe dismissed the case. Justice Frankfurter's plurality 
opinion found the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. 167 In support of 
this conclusion, Frankfurter stressed the prudential aspect of the 
Supreme Court's standing doctrine, 168 and noted that "[t]he undeviat-
ing policy of nullification by Connecticut of its anti-contraceptive laws 
throughout all the long years that they have been on the statute books 
bespeaks more than prosecutorial paralysis." 169 
Bickel interpreted the case, and in particular Frankfurter's refer-
162. See id. at 59-61. 
163. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). 
164. Id. at 63. 
165. Id. at 60. 
166. Id. at 61. 
167. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1961) (plurality opinion). 
168. See id. at 503. 
169. Id. at 502. 
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ences to nonenforcement, as standing for the proposition that had the 
appellants in the case been prosecuted, as opposed to seeking a declar-
atory judgment, the Supreme Court would have held that the prosecu-
tion "would fail on the grounds of desuetude." 170 Desuetude (as 
conceptualized by Bickel) stood for the proposition that "a statute that 
has never been enforced and that has not been obeyed for three-
quarters of a century may [not] suddenly be resurrected and ap-
plied."171 The doctrine was appropriate because "[t]he unenforced 
statute is not, in the normal way, a continuing reflection of the balance 
of political pressures. When it is resurrected and enforced, it repre-
sents the ad hoc decision of the prosecutor, unrelated to anything that 
may realistically be taken as present legislative policy." 172 
Poe did not stand for the proposition that Connecticut's birth con-
trol statute was unconstitutional, nor did it stand for the proposition 
that the statute was constitutional. Rather, it stood for the proposition 
that, before the Court would rule on the statute's constitutional merits, 
it wanted a considered judgment by a contemporary legislature that the 
statute should be enforced. As Bickel put it: 
The Court in the Birth Control Cases engaged in a sort of collo-
quy with the political institutions, begun by way of questions 
and answers at the [oral] argument, stylized and brought to a 
Socratic conclusion in the prevailing opinion. The upshot was 
the framing of conditions to invite a responsible legislative 
decision. 173 
More broadly, Bickel argued that courts should not be forced to 
choose between invalidating and upholding statutes. 174 Seeking a mid-
dle ground that permitted courts to engage in constitutional education 
without unnecessarily weakening majoritarian power, he argued that 
they should instead exploit various procedural devices to highlight for 
the legislature particular acts that were in constitutional gray areas. In 
addition to desuetude, Bickel suggested that the doctrines of delega-
tion of powers, ripeness, standing, and void for vagueness could be 
used to this end. 
Bickel's The Passive Virtues essay in general, as well as his use of the 
doctrine of desuetude, has evoked passionate criticism, with the most 
telling critique offered by Professor Gerald Gunther. 175 Gunther at-
tacked Bickel's reading of Poe, describing his use of the doctrine of des-
uetude as "novel and tenuous." 176 Gunther also attacked Bickel for 
170. Bickel, supra note 22, at 64. 
171. ld. at 62. 
172. Id. at 63. 
173. ld. at 64. 
174. This view has come to be known as the passive virtues doctrine. 
175. See Gunther, supra note 128. 
176. Id. at 20. For more detailed critiques of Bickel's desuetude argument, see 
Linda Rogers & William Rogers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 2-29 
(1966) (rejecting doctrine of desuetude); Mark P. Henriques, Note, Desuetude and 
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urging the Court to exploit technical devices to avoid deciding difficult 
questions of constitutional law. Employing particularly memorable 
phrasing, Gunther observed: "There indeed lies the novelty and vul-
nerability of the Bickel thesis: the emphasis on principle as the highest 
Court duty, but only in a limited sphere of Court actions; the 100% 
insistence on principle, 20% of the time." 177 
According to Gunther, the avoidance techniques that Bickel dis-
cussed in his article had precedentially established meanings. Bickel, 
however, was redefining them in order to give the Court the freedom to 
decide the constitutional cases it wanted to decide, and the ability to 
force legislative reconsideration when it thought that approach appro-
priate.178 Thus, while Bickel claimed to be an advocate of judicial re-
straint, he had developed an approach to constitutional law that would 
result in a "virulent variety of free-wheeling interventionism." 1 79 
Despite criticisms such as Gunther's, Bickel's vision has had a 
broad appeal for legal scholars. The notion of judicial review as consti-
tutional dialogue-which can be found in the work of such scholars as 
Louis Fisher, 180 Harry Wellington, 181 Henry Monaghan, 182 Terrance 
Declaratory Judgment: A New Challenge to Obsolete Laws, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1057, 1075 
(1990) (arguing that Bickel's reading of Poe was "strained" and that the doctrine of 
desuetude should not be exploited by courts to avoid constitutional questions). On the 
other hand, the West Virginia Supreme Court has recently read Poe much as Bickel did 
and invoked it in support of its use of desuetude to bar a criminal prosecution. See 
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720, 726-27 (W.Va. 1992) (describing 
desuetude as a widely accepted-if seldom applied-legal concept based on notions of 
fairness embodied in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). We are indebted 
to Professor Joseph Perillo for this reference. 
177. Gunther, supra note 128, at 3. 
178. See id. at 9-25; see also Calabresi, supra note 121, at 16-21 (advancing a 
similar criticism of Bickel). 
179. Gunther, supra note 128, at 25. 
180. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process 
3-6, 85-118 (1988) (advancing the theory that the three branches of government 
interact in an ongoing colloquy over constitutional law). 
181. See Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double 
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221, 265-311 ( 1973) (examining 
the allocation of responsibility for constitutional law making between the legislative and 
judicial branches); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 Yale LJ. 
486, 504-20 (1982) (examining the effect of judicial review on the more majoritarian 
branches' tendency to articulate their goals precisely and clearly); Harry H. Wellington, 
Book Review, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 326, 333-35 (1983) (reviewing Michael]. Perry, The 
Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights ( 1982) (urging legislative-judicial dialogue 
on constitutional questions)). 
182. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26-30 (1975) (suggesting that the 
creation of a federal common law regarding civil liberties provides the Court with a 
means for "involving the Congress in a continuing process of defining the context and 
consequences of individual liberties" thereby instituting a dialogue between the Court 
and the Congress). 
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Sandalow, 183 and Paul Dimond184-ultimately rests on the Bickelian 
premise that a primary role of courts in constitutional adjudication is to 
force legislatures to focus on the constitutional consequences of their 
acts. As Dimond has explained the concept of constitutional dialogue: 
[T]he Court itself may choose to invoke a variety of devices ... 
to kick a particular policy issue back to the legislature for re-
consideration. Such judicial actions merely operate as suspen-
sive vetoes and invite the people's elected representatives to 
reconsider the issue again and legislate more carefully and di-
rectly on the subject matter if they so choose .... 
The Court's rulings may take the form of final interpreta-
tions and at any point appear to be forever binding. Over 
time, however, they can be better understood as positing a 
provisional meaning, which will be followed, supplemented, 
expanded, eroded, distinguished, ignored, or reversed as the 
people and future Courts respond. 18 5 
Bickel's concern with vindicating current majorities has received its 
greatest elaboration in Guido Calabresi's A Common Law for the Age of 
Statutes, where it is applied outside of the constitutional context. 
Calabresi started from the premise that American society was "choking 
on obsolete statutes." 186 Because of societal change, and in particular 
because of the development of the regulatory state, this country had 
witnessed an" 'orgy of statute making.' " 187 The common law had per-
mitted courts to update the law to reflect societal and legal change. But 
statutory law had no such capacity for judicial updating. The legislative 
process was subject to what Calabresi called a "retentionist bias," 188 
which prevented legislative repeal or revision, even as majoritarian sup-
port for legislation disappeared. 
According to Calabresi, the need for change was not being met. 
"Although abrupt or frequent changes are often not desirable," he 
wrote, "laws must change to meet the needs of changing times and, in 
democratic systems, the demands of changing majorities or, perhaps 
more accurately, of changing coalitions of minorities." 189 This was not 
183. See Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 
1162, 1187-90 (1977) (By exercising constitutional review, courts "help ensure that the 
effective delegations of power required in a complex society do not lead to 
governmental action that departs from the society's fundamental values."). 
184. See Paul R. Dimond, The Supreme Court and Judicial Choice: The Role of 
Provisional Review in a Democracy 11-20, 153-56 (1989); Paul R. Dimond, Common 
Sense About an Uncommon Rejection, 15 Law & Soc. Inquiry 767, 798 (1990) 
[hereinafter Dimond, Common Sense] (reviewing Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of 
America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990) & Ethan Bronner, Battle for Justice: 
How the Bork Nomination Shook America (1989)). 
185. Dimond, Common Sense, supra note 184, at 798 (footnotes omitted). 
186. Calabresi, supra note 151, at 169. 
187. Id. at 1 (quoting Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 95 (1977)). 
188. Id. at 149, 164. 
189. Id. at 3. 
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happening. "[B]ecause a statute is hard to revise once it is passed, laws 
are governing us that would not and could not be enacted today, and 
... some of these laws not only could not be reenacted but also do not 
fit, are in some sense inconsistent with, our whole legallandscape." 190 
Some remedy was needed: "To let the statute stand is frequently to 
perpetuate the will of a majority that no longer exists." 191 
Calabresi proposed that courts take on the function of reviewing 
statutes, just as they reviewed common law precedent, to determine if 
they fit the "legal topography." 19 2 "What, then, is the common law 
function to be exercised by courts today?" he asked himself. He 
answered: 
It is no more and no less than the critical task of deciding when a reten-
tionist or a revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an existing statu-
tory or common law rule. It is the judgmental function . . . of 
deciding when a rule has come to be sufficiently out of phase 
with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can 
only stand if a current majoritarian or representative body re-
affirms it. It is to be the allocator of that burden of inertia 
which our system of separation of powers and checks and bal-
ances mandates. It is to assign the task of overcoming inertia 
to that interest, whose desires do not conform with the fabric 
of the law, and hence whose wishes can only be recognized if 
current and clear majoritarian support exists for them. 193 
Calabresi's theory has been generously praised, and it has at the 
same time sparked significant criticism. It has been suggested that 
there may well be too few "obsolescent" statutes to warrant concern. 194 
Judicial assumption of this new function without explicit congressional 
authorization has been attacked as lacking in legitimacy, 195 and it has 
been contended that Calabresi's system is unworkable. 196 None of 
these criticisms touches on Calabresi's central insight-which was also 
Bickel's: In a democracy, rules established by a current majority have a 
better claim to legitimacy than rules established by an old majority. 
Another criticism of Calabresi, however, deserves to be noted be-
cause it, unlike the others, applies to Bickel as well and should be con-
sidered in determining whether the Bickelian approach should be 
followed in the revival context. Critics charge Calabresi with failing to 
190. Id. at 2. 
191. Id. at 109. 
192. Id. at 18. 
193. ld. at 164. 
194. See Frank M. Coffin, The Problem of Obsolete Statutes: A New Role for 
Courts?, 91 Yale L.J. 827, 836 (1982) (reviewing Calabresi, supra note 151). 
195. See Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon 
Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126, 1136 (1982) (reviewing Calabresi, 
supra note 151). 
196. See Coffin, supra note 194, at 838-39. 
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acknowledge the importance of continuity in our governmental system. 
As Professor Farber wrote: 
Our legislative process is designed so that laws will outlive the 
political coalitions that enact them. It is not at all clear that a 
democratic system could function otherwise. What is clear is 
that pure majoritarianism has never been our system of gov-
ernment. It is a basic institutional requirement of our system 
of government that the legitimacy of a statute be independent 
of the current state of public opinion. 19' 
It is thus argued that Calabresi fails to accord adequate weight to the 
importance of inertia in our governmental system. "Without these con-
straints and constructs [that promote legislative inertia], legislatures 
would be plagued by instability and would be unable to function as de-
liberative bodies," 198 Farber wrote, and then added, "This is one of 
the fundamental insights of modern public choice theory." 199 
In the next section, we will apply the Bickelian insights to the revi-
val question and make the argument for nonrevival. We will also ex-
plain why the criticisms that have been leveled against Bickel's 
approach are irrelevant to our proposed solution of prospective 
overruling. 
B. Revival and Current Majoritarianism 
Bickel suggests that our primary concern should be with the deci-
sions made by current legislators, rather than with the decisions made 
by those in the past. As a general matter, according to the Bickelian 
view, if legislators today fail to pass any legislation in an area of consti-
tutional significance, then there should not be any legislation in that 
area in force. A strong form of this view would suggest that any legisla-
tion should expire after a relatively brief period of time. Bickel, how-
ever, stops short of this position. He argues that most statutes, because 
they are enforced, are subject to something akin to ongoing 
majoritarian review; the fact that the enforcement of a statute does not 
lead to its repeal suggests that the statute has a significant amount of 
support. It is only in the case of the unenforced statute that the judici-
ary should take steps to force legislative reconsideration. 
It should be recognized that implicit in Bickel's argument is a bias 
against regulation. This bias, although somewhat obscured by his 
stress on current majoritarian decision-making, is a necessary premise 
of his argument. When legislative forces are deadlocked in a matter 
197. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. 
LJ. 281, 308-09 (1989). 
198. Id. at 308. 
199. I d. at 308 n.140. For examples of works in public choice theory that stress the 
significance of stability in the legislative process, see William H. Riker, Liberalism 
Against Populism 169-95 (1982); Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, Legislative 
Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 423, 425-35 (1988). 
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that raises constitutional concerns (without necessarily violating the 
Constitution), Bickel assumes that the appropriate legal response is to 
employ a default rule under which no law is in effect. Yet, if one 
presumes deadlock, one also presumes that neither the forces in favor 
of the old law nor those in favor of repealing the old law have the nec-
essary support to shift the legal position from the position they oppose 
to the one that they desire. (Thus, the proponents of the statute could 
not secure its passage, if it were not on the books; its opponents could 
not secure its repeal, if it were already on the books). Neither enforce-
ment or nonenforcement, then, can appropriately be considered the re-
sult of current majoritarian decision-making. Bickel's bias against 
regulation breaks the deadlock. 
When the statute at issue imposes restraints on individual liberty-
even if those restraints are not unconstitutional-Bickel's argument ac-
cords with the most fundamental tenets of constitutional governance. 
As the framers repeatedly made clear in the ratification debates, our 
federal government is one of limited powers. Those powers that the 
people did not delegate, they retained. It was precisely for this reason 
that many argued that a Bill of Rights was not necessary: in enacting 
the Constitution, the people were not delegating the power to encroach 
on individual liberty. Thus, Hamilton argued in Federalist 84 that bills 
of rights "according to their primitive signification ... have no applica-
tion to constitutions, professedly founded upon the power of the peo-
ple and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. 
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain 
everything they have no need of particular reservations."200 
Coupled with the libertarian bias of our constitutional system, this 
suggests that if a statute diminishes individual liberty it should be en-
forceable only if it is desired by a current majority. In this context, 
then, Bickel's default rule of no regulation makes sense. But when a 
challenged statute implicates other areas of constitutional governance 
the argument loses its cogency. Other than the political reliance con-
cerns previously discussed and the individual reliance interests that the 
law has traditionally recognized, there is, for example, no obvious rea-
son why with respect to a statute that is problematic on, say, separation 
of powers grounds, a default position of no statute is preferable to the 
default position established by the old statute. 
Nonrevival of statutes implicating individual liberty directly follows 
from the Bickelian premises identified above. A statute that has been at 
one point at odds with governing decisions of constitutional law con-
cerned with the protection of individual liberty interests should be en-
forceable only if it is desired by a current majority that has been 
200. The Federalist No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 
1961). For the similar arguments of other Federalists, see Gordon S. Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787, at 539-41 (1969). 
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informed by judicial decisions of the relevant constitutional 
parameters. 
The Bickelian case for nonrevival is strongest when the statute has 
long been unenforced because of a judicial decision that held the stat-
ute unconstitutional or that announced a rule of law under which the 
statute was unconstitutional. Because of this passage of time, the paral-
lel between such a fact pattern and that in Poe is strong. The primary 
factual difference between the two situations is the reason for nonen-
forcement, and that difference makes the case for nonrevival stronger 
than the case for passive virtues. With respect to the birth control stat-
ute in Poe, nonenforcement both manifested and contributed to polit-
ical deadlock; deadlock was very clearly not the result of some prior 
judicial action. In the nonrevival context, however, for reasons 
presented in our discussion of political reliance, the initialjudicial deci-
sion of unconstitutionality altered the majoritarian decision-making 
process in a way that diminished the likelihood of repeal. In other 
words, in Poe, the fact that the statute had not been repealed indicated 
deadlock; in a case in which a statute has been held unconstitutional, 
failure to repeal may not mean deadlock. In the nonrevival context, 
then, there is much less reason to find in the decisions of past majori-
ties a surrogate for what a current majority would do, and there is 
therefore less reason to allow the decision of a past majority to estab-
lish the starting point for majoritarian decision-making. This argument 
concerning the appropriate starting point is particularly compelling 
when the past majority bears little resemblance to the current 
majority.2° 1 
The argument for nonrevival, however, is strong, even when the 
overruling decision follows shortly after the initial determination of un-
constitutionality. For Bickel, the passive virtues represented devices 
that courts could use to force legislative reconsideration of statutes that 
they believed were problematic, but that they were unwilling to pro-
nounce unconstitutional at that time. In the nonrevival situation, a ma-
jority of the court (although a past majority) once believed that the 
statute was not just problematic, but that it was unconstitutional. If 
courts and legislatures are to engage in constitutional dialogue, this is a 
situation in which it is particularly important for them to do so. Both 
the court decision holding a statute unconstitutional and the decision 
reversing the decision illuminate the constitutional concerns in an area. 
In other words, they apprise the legislature of what constitutional con-
cerns are implicated by a statute. Only if the legislature knows of these 
concerns is it a fully informed constitutional actor, and only then 
should its actions be enforceable. Thus, Bickel's insights suggest that 
revival should never occur. Any statute that has been judicially invali-
201. The 1855 statute at issue in Weeks makes this point dramatically, since the 
electorate that selected the legislature that passed that statute excluded women and 
African-Americans. 
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dated is thereby unenforceable for all time, although a second judicial 
decision reversing the first decision empowers the legislature to pass a 
statute identical to the one initially invalidated. 
Bickel's work, therefore, suggests a second argument for extension 
of the doctrine of prospective overruling to the statutory context: pro-
spective overruling is a device that courts can employ to remand to the 
legislature statutes that implicate individual liberty interests.202 In this 
view, the need to remand a statute justifies application of the technique 
of prospective overruling regardless of whether the case is one in which 
there has been political reliance. 
The nature of the technique of prospective overruling establishes 
limits as to its uses. Prospective overruling does not permit a court to 
remand all constitutionally problematic statutes. It permits a court to 
remand only those statutes that are inconsistent with prior governing 
decisions of constitutionallaw.2°3 
202. There may be instances in which there is a dispute about whether a statute 
implicates protected liberty interests. Assume, for example, a situation in which the 
invalidating decision concludes that a statute violates the right to privacy and the 
overruling decision finds that the Constitution does not protect a right to privacy. 
Supporters of the overruling decision might thus argue that the statute is not only 
constitutional, but that it does not even burden a cognizable liberty interest. 
Nonetheless, under the test set forth in this part, such a statute would not be revived 
because that statute was at one time inconsistent with governing case laws and because 
that case law was concerned with the protection of individual liberty interests. Such a 
result is appropriate for two reasons. First, the invalidating decision means that there 
has been significant support for the position that the statute is unconstitutional; such 
support weighs in favor of the result that the statute should be enforceable only if 
desired by a current majority. Second, the bright-line test used here sufficiently limits 
courts so they will be constrained in terms of which statutes they can force the 
legislature to reconsider; in other words, nonrevival in this limited category of cases 
(i.e., ones in which the overruling decision fails to recognize that a liberty interest is 
implicated) is consistent with our view that courts should be subject to significant 
constraints in their use of the technique of prospective overruling of statutes. 
203. The way in which we are using Bickel's and Calabresi's work here should thus 
be contrasted with their previous invocation in the context of arguments against revival 
of abortion statutes. We are not simply suggesting that courts should simply be able to 
remand constitutionally problematic statutes for reconsideration. See NARAL Brief, 
supra note 58, at 31 n.28 (invoking Calabresi, Bickel, and others in support of notion of 
remanding). We are, rather, suggesting that concerns that these authors identified 
warrant the creation of a new judicial technique which will have a limited range of 
applications. 
We are also not arguing for the use of desuetude or for that of a Calabresian second 
look doctrine. See Scott, supra note 58, at 381-88. As previously discussed, see supra 
notes 175-179, 194-199 and accompanying text, these techniques have been subject to 
telling criticism. Moreover, they do not address the problems associated with revival. A 
constitutionally problematic statute can still be consistent with the legal topography; 
thus, the Calabresian second look doctrine cannot force remanding in many situations in 
which it would be appropriate. Similarly, the doctrine of desuetude is inapplicable if the 
statute is recent or if, despite the fact that it is inconsistent with governing decisions of 
constitutional law, it has been consistently enforced (like the Washington State statute at 
issue in II' est Coast Hotel, see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text). 
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As has been pointed out, Bickel's passive virtues have been subject 
to substantial criticisms. But nonrevival of statutes through the use of 
the technique of prospective overruling-while it accords with Bickel's 
insights-is not subject to these criticisms. 
Gunther correctly observed that, as Bickel championed the various 
passive virtues judicial techniques, he also altered their substance, and 
he did so without establishing principled limits to their use. Because 
Bickel redefined the passive virtues techniques in a way that left them 
unconstrained by precedential limits, he gave courts almost complete 
freedom to decide to force reconsideration of statutes. 
Prospective overruling in the statutory context is, in contrast, a 
technique of limited application. It is of use only for a relatively small 
category of cases: those in which a finding of unconstitutionality is re-
versed. Prospective overruling in the statutory context, then, unlike 
Bickel's passive virtues, would not allow courts to provoke reconsidera-
tion of any statute that they found constitutionally troublesome. In-
deed, with respect to prospective overruling, the question is not 
whether there is substantial support for the position that a particular 
statute is unconstitutional. Rather, prospective overruling in this con-
text uses a simple bright line test: Is this statute one that was at one 
time inconsistent with governing case law, and was that case law based 
on protection of individual liberty interests?204 
The other principal critique of current majoritarianism is the pub-
lic choice critique that Farber advanced against Calabresi, but that is 
equally applicable to Bickel. Farber argued that our system of govern-
ment is premised on the idea that legislation enacted under the aus-
pices of temporarily assembled coalitions will be enforced. Political 
actors order their priorities in reliance on that fact, and to allow legisla-
tion that lacks current majoritarian support to expire would be to strip 
our governmental system of stability. 
Again, this critique does not apply to the revival issue. The 
Calabresian and Bickelian models give judges permission to roam 
freely through the legal landscape, invalidating a wide range of laws. 
Revival arises in a limited number of situations, as the dearth of cases 
on point suggests. Thus, while the Calabresian and Bickelian models 
by their very breadth threaten the expectations of political actors and 
204. Again, it should be made clear that this is a separate inquiry from the political 
reliance inquiry. If there is political reliance that meets the criteria set forth above (see 
supra text accompanying notes 141-149), prospective overruling is appropriate, even if 
the statute at issue does not implicate liberty interests. 
One gloss, however, should be added to the rule stated in the text: When the court 
has already signalled its willingness to reexamine the invalidating decision-the Baker 
case in the typology previously mentioned-and a statute inconsistent with the 
invalidating decision is passed, there is no need for prospective overruling of that statute 
if the invalidating decision is reversed: ~nformed by the initial invalidating decision, the 
legislature has nonetheless decided that it wants the statute, and it has done so at a time 
in which the political process is not skewed by reliance on judicial decisions. 
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could cause an underinvestment of efforts in political movements, revi-
val does not raise that issue. 
Moreover, as our discussion of political reliance shows, while the 
Bickelian and Calabresian models undermine the inertial quality of our 
governmental system, nonrevival reinforces it. In other words, the 
Bickelian and Calabresian models tell political actors that they cannot 
allocate resources in reliance on the law as currently reflected in the 
body of statutes that the courts have not stricken. Thus, if Bickel's ap-
proach had been followed, birth control opponents in Connecticut 
would not have been able to rely on the existence of a statute as suffi-
cient protection of their position; they would also have had to allocate 
their resources to securing enforcement, even though they were satis-
fied with the status quo. Under nonrevival, however, political actors 
can rely on judicial invalidation of a statute as a bar to future enforce-
ment of that statute and structure their political activities accordingly. 
There is no uncertainty, no misallocation of resources. 
Nonetheless, it should be recognized that prospective overruling in 
cases involving constitutionally problematic statutes is less consistent 
with precedent than prospective overruling designed to protect polit-
ical reliance. Prospective overruling to protect political reliance is simi-
lar to well-established techniques that courts use to protect those who 
rely on judicial pronouncements. There is, in contrast, only a small 
body of opinions that can be used to support the notion that courts 
remand constitutionally problematic statutes for reconsideration, 205 
and similarly, there is no well-established analogue to a technique that 
would allow courts to evaluate constitutionally problematic statutes 
under the rule of the invalidating decision, rather than under the rule 
of the subsequent overruling decision. 
Thus, the strength of the argument for use of the doctrine of pro-
spective overruling in evaluating constitutionally problematic statutes 
rests on first principles. Since the criticisms of Bickel and Calabresi do 
not provide bases for rejecting nonrevival through prospective overrul-
ing, the choice between revival and nonrevival is reduced to a choice 
between two different majoritarian approaches. Should courts adopt 
the revival position and enforce the decisions of past majorities-deci-
sions uninformed by evolving constitutional doctrine-when those de-
cisions affect individual liberty? Or should they, in accordance with the 
nonrevival position, leave the matter to the resolution of current major-
ities, informed by the relevant judicial decisions? As Bickel's writings 
demonstrate, the latter option is the one that is consistent with our con-
stitutional system's commitment to the promotion of liberty. 
CoNCLUSION 
People rely on the finality of judicial decisions. Over seventy years 
205. See cases cited supra note 58. 
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ago, Benjamin Cardozo argued that courts should be free to protect 
that reliance interest by overruling their prior decisions prospectively 
and not applying a new rule of law to transactions that predated its 
announcement.206 In this Article, we have argued that that logic is 
equally applicable to the political context. When courts overrule a 
prior decision, they should be able to judge statutes passed before the 
new decision under the constitutional principles that had been in place 
prior to the overruling decision. Prospective overruling with respect to 
statutes is at odds with much of the limited body of relevant cases and 
commentary, which has been premised on the notion that revival of 
statutes that have been "unconstitutional" under previous case law 
merely implements the majoritarian will. This premise, however, fails 
to take into account the way in which ajudicial determination of uncon-
stitutionality alters the political process. Revival can produce a 
counter-majoritarian result and harm those political actors who have 
relied on the court's initial judgment. 
Use of prospective overruling is also appropriate when there has 
been governing case law under which a statute, or one substantially 
similar to it, was held to violate an individual liberty right protected by 
the Constitution. When that governing case law is overturned, the stat-
ute should have to be repassed before it can be enforceable; statutes 
that implicate individual liberty interests should be enforced only if the 
current majority supports them. 
206. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
